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ABSTRACT




For demand response in smart grid, a utility company wants to minimize
total electricity cost and end users want to maximize their own utility. The latter is
considered to consist of two parts in this research: electricity cost and
convenience/comfort. We first develop a system optimal (SO) model and a user
equilibrium (UE) model for the utility company and end users, respectively and
compare the difference of the two. We consider users’ possible preference on
convenience over cost-saving under the real-time pricing in smart grid, and each
user is assumed to have a preferred time window for using a particular appliance.
As a result, each user in the proposed energy consumption game wishes to maximize
a payoff or utility consisting of two parts: the negative of electricity cost and the
convenience of using appliances during their preferred time windows. Numerical
results show that users with less flexibility on their preferred usage times have larger
impact on the system performance at equilibrium.
Second, we found that instead of minimizing total cost, if utility company is
regulated to maximize the social welfare, the user equilibrium model can achieve
identical optimal solution as the system optimal model. We then design a demand
response pricing frame work to accomplish this goal under alternative secondary
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objectives. We also investigate the non-uniqueness of the user equilibrium solution
and prove that there exist alternative user equilibrium solutions. In this case, robust
pricing is considered using multi-level optimization for the user equilibrium.
Third, we study empirical data from a demand response pilot program in
Kentucky in an attempt to understand consumer behavior under demand response
and to characterize the thermo dynamics when set point for heat, ventilation and
air conditioning (HVAC) is adjusted for demand response. Although sample size is
limited, it helps to reveal the great variability in consumers’ response to demand
response event. Using the real data collected, we consider to minimize the peak
demand for a system consisting of smart thermostats, advanced hot water heaters
and battery systems for storage. We propose a mixed integer program model as well
as a heuristic algorithm for an optimal consumption schedule so that the system
peak during a designated period is minimized. Therefore, we propose a consumption
scheduling model to optimally control these loads and storage in maximizing
efficiency without impacting thermal comfort. The model allows pre-cooling and
pre-heating of homes to be performed for variable loads in low-demand times.
We propose several future works. First, we introduce the concept of elastic
demand to our SO model and UE model. The system problem maximizes net
benefit to the energy consumers and the user problem is the usual one of finding
equilibrium with elastic demand. The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions can
be applied to solve the elastic demand problems. We also propose to develop
algorithms for multi-level pricing models and further collect and analyze more field
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“The grid”, refers to the electric power grid, a network system that consists
of transmission lines, substations, transformers and more (shown in Figure 1). It
delivers electricity from the power plant to residential homes or businesses [1]. The
first alternating current power grid was built in 1886 in the small city of Great
Barrington, MA [2]. Since then, the power grid has been improved dramatically as
technology advanced through each decade. The current US power grid consists of
more than 9,200 electric generating units with more than 1 million megawatts of
generating capacity, which is connected by more than 300,000 miles of transmission
lines [1].
Although the electric grid is considered an engineering marvel, it has to face
so many challenges today, such as generation diversification, optimal deployment of
expensive assets, demand response, energy conservation, and reduction of the
industry’s overall carbon footprint, that it is not designed and engineered to handle
[1][3][4]. The above listed critical issues cannot be addressed within the confines of
the existing electricity power grid [3].
The existing electricity grid is one-way communication in nature. Two-thirds
of fuel energy is wasted and cannot be converted into electricity. Almost 8% of its
output is lost during the transmission from the generation facility to end users. In
addition, 20% of its generation capacity exists to meet peak demand, which occurs
only 5% of the time. Furthermore, because of the hierarchical topology of its assets,
the current power grid experiences domino-impact failures [3]. To move forward, we
require another sort of electric grid, which is developed from the base to handle the
1
Figure 1. General layout of electricity networks [5]
upsurge of digital and computerized equipment and innovation subject to it – and
which can automate and manage the increasing complexity and needs of electricity
in the 21st Century. The next-generation electricity grid, which is also called smart
grid or intelligent grid, is expected to overcome the major disadvantages of the
existing grid.
The smart grid is a modern grid infrastructure to improve efficiency,
reliability and security. Using automated control and modern communications
technologies, it can smoothly integrate renewable and alternative energy sources
[6][7]. Critically, smart grid empowering new network management strategies
provide an effective grid integration in Distributed Generation (DG) for demand
response (DR) and energy storage for DG load balancing, etc. [8][9]. Under this
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circumstance, renewable energy generators is not only a promising technology to
reduce fuel consumption and greenhouse gas emissions [10], renewable energy
sources (RES) also become part of a reliable grid system. The integration of RES
reduces system losses and enhances the reliability, efficiency and security of
electricity supply to customers, which are some of the benefits that smart grid
system will bring [11]. The existing grid is lack of ability to communicate, while a
smart power grid infrastructure is sufficiently strengthened in enhanced sensing and
advanced communication and computing abilities (see Figure. 2). Different
components of the system are connected together with communication paths and
sensors to provide advanced sensing and control, among which are distribution,
transmission and other substations, i.e. residential, commercial, and industrial
customers [12].
Figure 2. Framework of smart grid [12]
In essence, the smart grid needs to provide the utility companies with full
visibility and pervasive control over their assets and services. Advanced metering
infrastructure (AMI) for its significant effect in terms of system operation, asset
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management, especially in energy saving and emission reduction achieved by DR
technology has become the most popular research area throughout the power
industry [13]. AMI uses two-way communication network, which can remotely
connect and disconnect services, record waveforms, monitor voltage and current,
send alarm information back to center within near real-time, and support
time-of-use and real-time rate structures [13]-[15].
Additionally, the smart grid is required to be self-healing and resilient to
system anomalies. Both simulation models [16][17] and optimization models
[18]-[20] have been developed and investigated by many researchers to promote trust
in smart grid solutions in safe and cost effective ways. Ghosn et al.[21] design an
agent-oriented simulation model which can help understand smart grid issues and
identify ways to improve the electrical grid. Their focus is mainly on the self-healing
problem on how to activate control solutions in order to either take preventative
actions or to handle problems after they occur. Alderson et al. [22] demonstrate a
defender-attacker-defender (DAD) sequential game model to plan defenses for an
infrastructure system that will enhance that system’s resilience against attacks by
an intelligent adversary. They also develop a general decomposition algorithm for
solving DAD models and it only requires the system-operation model to be
continuous and convex.
And last but not least, the smart grid needs to empower its stake holders to
define and realize new ways of engaging with each other and performing energy
transactions across the system. The integration of RES in smart grid is a challenging
task, primarily because of the intermittent and unpredictable nature of the sources,
either wind or polar [23]. Significant improvements can be made to the operations of
a smart grid by providing information about the likely behavior of renewable energy
through both online short-term forecasting and long-term assessments [24]. Another
issue concerns the way to support the consumers’ participation in the electricity
market aiming at minimizing the costs of the system energy consumption [23].
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In the advent of smart grid, demand response (DR) presents significant
opportunities for load shifting, which helps flatten the demand curves, decrease the
peak-to-average ratio, and hence reduce total cost. Managing residential electricity
consumption, which accounts for 22% of the US energy consumption in 2008, is an
important part to make the system more economical. Particularly, when consumers’
use of electricity is mainly driven by convenience, coincident demand occurs,
resulting in electric load peaks that greatly increase the generation costs. Early
approach of consumer response can date back to the 1980’s [25]. More recently, both
centralized optimization models and decentralized game-theoretic models have been
introduced to study strategies to flatten the load curves in DR and to study
consumer behaviors. In centralized models, a central controller is assumed to be
able to control and distribute the loads, with the objective of optimizing the total
cost and user satisfaction (e.g., Gatsis and Giannakis [26]). With the advancement
of communication technologies and smart meters within a smart grid, price signals
can reach to the consumers in real time and in some cases the local/central
operators can directly control the usage of some appliances. This increased ability
for consumers and operators to interact within the power system has sparked
interests in more decentralized models for describing individual’s energy
consumption scheduling and its impact on the power system [27].
Under smart pricing schemes, users are encouraged to individually and
voluntarily manage their loads by reducing their energy consumption during peak
hours [28]-[30]. In price based programs, time-of-use pricing (TOU), critical-peak
pricing (CPP), extreme day CPP (ED-CPP), extreme day pricing (EDP) and
real-time pricing (RTP) are among the popular options [31]. For example, in RTP
scheme, the price of electricity varies at different hours of the day. The prices are
usually higher during the afternoon of hot days in the summer and cold days in the
winter [32].
In this dissertation proposal, we first propose a game theoretical approach to
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modeling energy consumption scheduling in smart grid with consumer preference.
We develop a system optimum model and a user equilibrium model. The objective
of the system model is to minimize the total electricity cost of the entire system. In
this model, the area central controller determines when and how much each user
should use his/her appliances, so that the system can achieve the minimum total
electricity cost. But for each user, it may not be the minimum cost for him/her.
Also, as the end user, each one has his/her preference on how to use the appliances.
They may not want to compromise the convenience to less cost. So in our user
equilibrium model, we want to describe users’ energy consumption behavior which
considers users’ possible preference on convenience and cost. This makes the user
equilibrium model more realistic. The objective of the user equilibrium model is to
maximize each user’s payoff or utility, which is the utility function minus the
electricity cost. We assume that each user has the knowledge of the usage profile of
others. We depict the convenience experienced each user in term of monetary value
in the utility function. The user equilibrium solution is always different from the
system optimal solution. In terms of the total cost and peak load reduction, it is
always worse than the system model.
Second, we develop a pricing model to see if there exists proper pricing
scheme that can make the system model and the user equilibrium model share the
same users energy consumption profile. The objective of the system model is to
maximize the social welfare, which is the convenience-based utility function minus
the electricity generation cost function. This is similar to the objective of the user
equilibrium model, which is the convenience-based utility function minus the time
variant based electricity cost. We show that for a pre-specified system optimal
solution, there exists alternative pricing schemes to achieve the desired objective. In
this way, the pricing scheme becomes adjustable and the utility company may
customize the pricing scheme to achieve proper objectives. We also prove that at
the equilibrium, the users’ energy consumption pattern of user equilibrium may not
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follow the system optimal solution if the user equilibrium has multiple solutions
under a given pricing scheme. Then, we propose a robust pricing multi-level
optimization problem to maximize the minimum possible social welfare among
alternative user equilibrium solutions. The column and constraint generation
algorithm or bender’s dual cutting plane algorithm might be two of our potential
methods to solve the proposed bi-level model.
Third, we study empirical data from a demand response pilot program in
Kentucky in an attempt to understand consumer behavior under demand response
and to characterize the thermo dynamics when set point for HVAC is adjusted for
demand response. Using the real data collected, we consider to minimize the peak
demand for a system consisting of smart thermostats, advanced hot water heaters
and battery systems for storage. We propose a mixed integer program model as well
as a heuristic algorithm for an optimal consumption schedule so that the system
peak during a designated period is minimized. Therefore, we propose a consumption
scheduling model to optimally control these loads and storage in maximizing
efficiency without impacting thermal comfort. The model allows pre-cooling and
pre-heating of homes to be performed for variable loads in low-demand times and/or
when renewable generation resources are on-line, so as to get maximum utilization
from these resources.
The rest of this proposal is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the
literature on optimization models and algorithms on DR. Chapter 3 formulates the
centralized model and game theoretical model for DR with costumer preference and
its numerical results. Chapter 4 presents the pricing model for DR with consumer
preference and its computational results. Chapter 5 presents the empirical study of
energy consumption in sub-metered homes and the optimal consumption scheduling




2.1 Direct Load Control
Direct load control (DLC) has been investigated for a long time and there is
a large literature of classical DLC on load management. Most optimization methods
have been proposed to minimize generation cost [33]-[35]. Particularly, Cohen and
Wang [33] develop an effective optimization method for scheduling load management
based on an analytic model of the load under control. Their method can be used to
minimize different objectives including peak load and production cost. Although it
is impossible to determine how close the solutions generated by this method are to
the optimal schedules, they have found that the schedules produced are effective in
reducing the value of the objective and that they cannot be easily improved upon.
Furthermore, the solution method can obtain schedules for difficult problems
involving very long periods of peak load and cases where the cycle rate is allowed to
vary. Its advantage is to allow any length for the control periods and any cycle
rates. While the disadvantage in allowing the cycle rate to vary is that run time will
increase almost linearly with the number of allowed cycle rates.
Similarly, Wei and Chen [34] apply multi-pass dynamic programming
(MPDP) to determine the required amount of load to be controlled at each time
stage in order to reach maximum cost saving and peak load reduction. They test
the proposed approach on Taiwan Power Company system to demonstrate its
effectiveness. Results show that the peak load reduction and production cost saving
are closely related to the energy payback pattern. Furthermore, the MPDP
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approach would also yield a load control value for each time stage during the whole
study period. They claim that their algorithm is also suitable for the solution of
problems with other types of load control operation because of its reasonable
results, fast calculation speed and small storage memory requirement.
Another method for DLC dispatch other than dynamic programming is
presented by Chen et al. [35]. For a DLC group, their method identifies a set of
candidate control patterns in terms of feasibility and cost benefit. Based on the
candidate control patterns, they determine the optimal DLC dispatch strategy via a
binary flow network model. They also compare their results with a dynamic
programming based DLC dispatch method and show their method is very effective.
The second aspect of the DLC’s objective is to maximize utility’s profit [36].
Ng and Sheble [36] introduce the profit-based load management to examine generic
direct load control scheduling. Their aim is to increase the profit of utilities based
on the cost/market price function. Their linear programming algorithm controls the
number of groups per customer/load type to maximize the profit. They compare
their profit-based DLC with the conventional cost-based approach and results show
that the former achieves better solution when the rate structure varies each time.
Furthermore, the algorithm provides a relatively inexpensive and powerful approach
to the scheduling problem.
Minimizing deviation from users’ desired consumptions is the third aspect of
DLC’s objective [37][38]. In order to solve the chronic problem of severe power
shortage in the summer for the Taiwan Power Company (TPC), Chu et al. [37]
adopt the method of dynamic programming to optimally determine the schedule of
the DLC with the objective of minimizing the amount of load reduction to lessen
the effects of customers’ discomfort and to maintain the TPC’s total incomes. They
consider the constraints of operation limitations of the compressor and room
temperature. They claim that their method is able to dynamically specify the
target load level, and should also be helpful for other utilities trying to control the
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growth rates of peak loads in their attempt to match their schedules of system
planning and thereby to reap the maximal benefit.
Ramanathan and Vittal [38] develop a framework for designing and assessing
DLC program with the objective of minimizing end-user discomfort and is
formulated as an optimization problem. Two different algorithms for cycling of
loads have been presented and Monte Carlo-based dynamic programming approach
is applied. The results of the simulations are with regard to the impact of different
constraints and parameters on the effectiveness of control. They also claim that
their method could be applied in designing and analyzing the effectiveness of other
demand-side management programs.
Finally, DLC is sometimes integrated with unit commitment [39]. Hsu and
Su [39] integrate the DLC dispatch problem into conventional unit commitment
problem. They apply dynamic programming to determine the required amount of
load control and generation schedule at each stage in order to maximize fuel cost
savings. The total fuel cost can be reduced through peak load reduction and
rescheduling of peaking units. It is also observed that the proposed dynamic
programming approach would yield a variable amount of load control for each stage
over the load control period. Their DLC dispatching strategy will result in more
fuel cost savings than the fixed DLC dispatching strategy.
2.2 Distributed and Game Theoretical User Equilibrium Model
Distributed algorithm for coordinated scheduling, is motivated by
individualism in decision making in energy consumption and has attracted many
researchers in the past decades. Compared to DLC, decentralize/distributed
scheduling assumes there is no central controller and all individuals decide or
optimize their own energy consumption profiles. As a result, the agent-based
approach (e.g., [40]) seems to be a good fit to model individuals’ consumption
behavior.
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For example, Vytelingum et al. [41] implement the agent-based concept in
developing a micro-storage management algorithm for the smart grid. In their
model, each agent fixes his or her storage profile based on forecasted market price.
Vytelingum et al. [41] prove that the average storage profile from their distributed
algorithm converges to the Nash Equilibrium. Consequently, average peak demand
induced by the optimal storage profile is reduced, thus eliminating the requirements
for more costly and carbon-intensive generation plant.
In addition, Vandael et al. [42] propose a multi-agent solution and compared
the qualities of this solution with an optimal reference solution obtained by
quadratic programming. They use a decentralized model to level the load at each
transformer through two coordination strategies: the energy limiter and power
limiter. The former only uses predictions about loads, while the latter doesn’t use
any forecast data. In [42], the multi-agent solution proves to be scalable and
adaptable to incomplete and unpredictable information, while still capable of
reducing peak demands with an efficiency up to 95% compared to the quadratic
scheduler.
In fact, understanding individuals’ behavior in energy consumption is
considered as one key (among others) to the success of DR, because it will help
effectively manage demands via pricing or incentive programs. In the literature,
game-theoretic approaches have been the main stream (e.g., Saad et al. [43] and
Fadlullah et al. [44]) for modeling the consumer behaviors. Most of these studies
assume each consumer optimizes his/her own cost in their energy consumption
scheduling.
In [43], Saad et al. provide an overview on the applications of game theory in
smart grid networks. In the areas of microgrids, demand-side management, and
communications, they have identified the main technical challenges and discussed on
how game theory can be applied to address these challenges. Moreover, they
propose several future directions for extending these approaches and adopting
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advanced game theoretic techniques, so as to reduce the gap between theoretical
models and practical implementations of future smart grids.
Fadlullah et al. [44] survey a number of game theory-based applications to
solve different problems in smart grid. Their survey reveals that game theory can be
apparently simple yet become an effective technique to facilitate intelligent decision
making in smart grid frameworks. They also notice that many of the game theory
applications do not provide the global solution to the considered problem, which
might be challenging in applying game theory to solve different optimization
problems since the solution may remain stuck to a local minimum. In addition, the
time to reach the Nash equilibrium point, in particular the global optimum, should
be considered by researchers when applying game theory to solve smart grid
communication problems.
More related to our work, Mohsenian-Rad et al. [45] propose a distributed
algorithm to study consumers’ optimal energy consumption scheduling when they
are equipped with communication devices enabling them to talk to each other on
energy usage. Their work in [45] assumes that each consumer minimizes his/her
“utility payment,” while we assume consumers value the convenience of using
appliances at preferred times and incorporate this in the model.
In addition, Chen et al. [46] propose a real-time pricing based power
scheduling scheme as a demand response mechanism for residential electric power
consumption. A Stackelberg game model is formulated to analyze the interaction
between a consumer’s Energy Management Controller and the service provider.
Their scheme can reduce peak load and the mismatch between actual load and
planned supply, while avoiding a rebound peak. They allow users to delay the
starting time of their usage of the appliances in order to reduce cost. However, users’
experience on convenience is not directly modeled in [46] as is in our approach.
Furthermore, Maharjan et al. [47] propose a Stackelberg game between
utility companies and end-users to maximize the revenue of each utility company
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and the payoff of each user. They assume users will choose different utility
companies as the leader in the Stackelberg game and derive analytical results for the
Stackelberg equilibrium of the game and prove that a unique solution exists. They
also propose a scheme based on the concept of shared reserve power to improve the
grid reliability and ensure its dependability.
Finally, Samadi et al. [48] model the users’ preferences and their energy
consumption patterns in form of selected utility functions based on concepts from
microeconomics. They also propose a distributed algorithm which finds the optimal
energy consumption levels for each subscriber, so that the aggregate utility of all
subscribers in the system is maximized in a fair and efficient way. Samadi et al. [48]
show that the energy provider can encourage some desirable consumption patterns
among the subscribers by the means of real-time pricing. The simulation results
confirm that the proposed distributed algorithm can potentially benefit both
subscribers and the energy provider.
2.3 Pricing Schemes
A crucial element in any DR study is the choice of the electricity cost/price,
which has been studied rather extensively. Most studies on electricity markets
incorporate quadratic functions describing the relationship between cost and electric
usage. Furthermore, pricing approaches have been proposed to help shift the
electricity load from peak to off-peak hours (e.g., Samadi et al. [48]).
In [49], a piecewise linear approximation is often applied to ease
computational burden that would otherwise be experienced by quadratic models.
On the other hand, the residential ‘time-of-use’ (TOU) rate has also been actively
studied at various U.S. cities through projects funded by the U.S. Department of
Energy over the past decades. The first project to implement the residential TOU
rate began in 1975 in Vermont and was documented in [50]. The latter provides a
detailed analysis of the TOU experiments in residential areas. Aigner [50] concludes
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that effective pricing mechanism to change consumers’ behavior is among the most
important issues to the success of TOU rates. Other studies focusing on the impacts
of TOU rates include [51], [52], [53], and [54].
In order to mitigate peak demand due to the extra load of charging electric
vehicles (EVs) , Collins and Mader [51] utilize time-of-day pricing of electricity that
causes a driver to shift recharging to periods in the day when electricity price is low.
This would increase the utilization of baseload power plants and reduce the average
cost of generating electricity.
For the purpose of better understanding the effectiveness of how TOU rates
can economically incent off-peak charging in plug-in hybrid electric vehicles
(PHEV), Davis and Bradley [52] present a simulation of PHEV total fueling costs
and metrics of performance for evaluation of various TOU rate designs. Their
results show that TOU rates are not universally effective at incenting off-peak
PHEV charging behavior. By analyzing a suite of TOU rate models, the
effectiveness and total fueling costs associated with a TOU rate is shown to be a
function of the type of vehicle that the consumer is driving, the on:off peak price
ratio of the TOU rate, and the length of the off-peak period.
Baladi et al. [53] estimate the response of residential consumers to voluntary
TOU electricity pricing, both in terms of their willingness to participate in the rate
structure and in their ability to shift usage. They find that the usage patterns of
volunteers and non-volunteers were virtually identical under flat rates and on the
TOU tariff. The only difference between volunteers and non-volunteers appears to
be in their perceived usage patterns and their perceived ability to respond to the
rate structure. This raises the issue as to whether education programs might alter
these results in the long term, which is not discussed in [53].
Similarly, Hartway et al. [54] describe the results of a TOU rate option
experiment which demonstrates that offering a TOU option can be profitable to a
utility company. Their finding refutes the common belief that rate options are
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necessarily unprofitable to a utility and unwanted by small users.
Other than the TOU rates, real-time pricing (RTP) structure is another
intensively investigated pricing scheme by researchers (e.g. [32], [46], [48] and [55]).
Lijesen [32] provides a quantification of the real-time relationship between
total peak demand and spot market prices. They find a low value for the real-time
price elasticity, which may because not all users observe the spot market price.
Their main policy implication is that the real-time elasticity of targeted users should
be assessed before expensive demand response measures are taken on a large scale.
Similarly, Mohsenian-Rad and Leon-Garcia [55] point out that the lack of
knowledge among users about how to respond to time-varying prices as well as the
lack of effective building automation systems are two major barriers for fully
utilizing the potential benefits of real-time pricing tariffs. Therefore, they propose
an optimal and automatic residential energy consumption scheduling framework to
tackle these problems. They attempt to achieve a desired trade-off between
minimizing the electricity payment and minimizing the waiting time for the
operation of each appliance in household in presence of a real-time pricing tariff
combined with inclining block rates. By applying a simple and efficient weighted
average price prediction filter to the actual hourly-based prices, Mohsenian-Rad and
Leon-Garcia [55] obtain the optimal choices of the coefficients for each day of the
week. Simulation results show that the combination of the proposed energy
scheduler design and the price predictor leads to significant reduction in users’
payments.
In addition to only changing the price, incentive-based demand response
approaches are also effective in load shifting (e.g., Zhong et al. [56]). They propose
the coupon incentive-based demand response to to induce flexibility in retail
customers on a voluntary basis. The main advantages of their scheme are improved
social welfare and consumers not exposed to fluctuating wholesale electricity prices.
However, there also exists obvious disadvantages, such as increasing the burden of
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communications and keeping some potential responsive customers away from the
program.
Because all consumers respond to the price signals in adjusting their
consumption behaviors, Stackelberg game is used by Meng and Zeng [57] for
determining proper incentive. In [57], Meng and Zeng propose a Stackelberg game
approach to maximize the profit of the utility company and minimize the payment
bills of its customers. They model the interactions between the utility company and
its electricity customers as a 1-leader, N-follower Stackelberg game. At the leader’s
side, they adopt genetic algorithms to maximize its profit while at the followers’
side, an analytical solution to the linear programming problem is develop to
minimize their bills. Simulation results show that their proposed approach is
beneficial for both the customers and the utility company.
Moreover, Fetz and Filippini [58] have studied the economies of vertical
integration and economies of scale. Specifically, they use different econometric
specifications for panel data, including a random effects and a random-coefficients
model, to estimate a quadratic multi-stage cost function for a sample of electricity
companies. The empirical results in [58] reflect the presence of considerable
economies of vertical integration and economies of scale for most companies
considered in the analysis. Moreover, the results suggest a variation in economies of
vertical integration across companies due to unobserved heterogeneity.
Finally, concerning the production cost, Mart´ınez-Budr´ıa et al. [59] have
adapted productivity analysis to the case of a cost model. A normalized quadratic
cost function is estimated and discrete data has been used in their research. The
main theoretical result in [59] is a productivity index that can be decomposed into
modified versions of the contribution of technical change and the effect of the
variations in the scale of production. The results also show important productivity
gains with both technical change and scale effect playing important roles.
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2.4 Customers’ Preferences
The dissertation assumes that the consumers take into consideration not only
their energy costs but also the convenience of their energy consumption schedule.
This is because the fact that people would like to pay more for the convenience to
their personal schedule, even if such preference implies a higher system-wide cost.
Not much literature we found considers the customers’ preferences or convenience.
Sianaki et al. [60] claim that in literature, no approach focuses on the users’
point of view at the home level on a continuous basis and in an intelligent way to
achieve demand response. They develop an intelligent decision supporting system
model at home level for increasing the efficiency of energy consumption in the Smart
Grid. They believe that their system will adapt to consumers’ preferences and be
compatible with demand response in the Smart Grid. The aim of their proposed
approach is to urge end users to increase their consumption of renewable sources of
energy and decrease the consumption of nonrenewable sources.
Amer et al. [61] propose the algorithm that can manage the household loads
according to end user’s preset priority and fix the total household power
consumption under certain limit. The method in [61] makes the homeowner to
automatically perform smart load controls possible. Controls are based on utility
programs, customer’s preference and load priority . They claim that their work
achieves the purpose of reducing electricity expense and clipping the
peak-to-average ratio (PAR).
Yoo and Lee [62] present the analysis of the power saving effect and the
customer satisfaction level for In-Home Display usage. They analyze the power
consumption and consumer preferences through the validation between the
experimental group and the control group. From the results obtained from the
questionnaire used, they also confirm the customer satisfaction. Yoo and Lee [62]
are expected to improve the energy saving effect further, if the service providers
supply a variety of devices to the customers to verify their power consumption
17
information more conveniently in the future.
18
CHAPTER 3
A GAME THEORETICAL APPROACH FOR DEMAND
RESPONSE WITH CONSUMER PREFERENCE
The department of energy estimates that residential buildings accounted for
37% of the total electricity consumption in 2008, and the percentage will grow much
higher upon a broad adoption of electrical vehicles. Thus, energy consumption
management in residential buildings becomes a pressing issue for our society to be
sustainable. Particularly, when consumers’ use of electricity is mainly driven by
convenience, coincident demand occurs, resulting in electric load peaks that greatly
increase the generation costs. In the advent of smart grid where price and usage
data can be exchanged between consumers and utilities, demand side management
(DSM) or demand response presents significant opportunities for load shifting and
leveling.
Mohsenian-Rad et al. [45] propose a distributed algorithm to study
consumers’ optimal energy consumption scheduling. Their work assumes that each
consumer minimizes his/her utility payment, while we assume consumers value the
convenience of using appliances at preferred times and incorporate this in the
model. In addition, Chen et al. [46] and Mohsenian-Rad et al. [55] allow users to
delay the starting time for using appliances in order to reduce cost. However, users’
experience on convenience is not directly modeled in their works as is in our
approach. Finally, Maharjan et al. [47] assume users will choose different utility
companies through a Stackelberg game. In summary, the current study assumes
that consumers take into consideration not only their energy costs but also the
convenience of their energy consumption schedule, and the latter is the focus for
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subsequent numerical simulations.
In this chapter, we first propose a user (equilibrium) model to describe users’
energy consumption behavior that explicitly considers users’ possible preference on
convenience over cost-saving. In this user equilibrium model, each user maximizes
his/her payoff consisting of convenience and cost. To our best knowledge, most
DSM literature assumes minimizing cost is the only objective for users, which is
unrealistic. Indeed, in a recent smart meter/appliances pilot program by General
Electric (GE) and Louisville Gas & Electric Company (LG&E), participants praised
the program for it allows them to override the cost-saving based schedule [64].
Second, a centralized system-wide optimization model is developed as a benchmark
for the user equilibrium model. The system model is for a central controller to
maximize all users’ payoffs collectively. Third, extensive sensitivity analysis provides
insights on how consumers with various monetary values for convenience and with
various flexibility on their energy consumption schedule affect the system
equilibrium differently. Numerical experiments further validate both the system and
user equilibrium models, and show that system performance is affected by both
consumers’ preferences and their value for convenience. Users who are less flexible
in shifting their consumption schedule have more influence on the equilibrium.
Further, consumers who value convenience higher will have a larger impact on the
system’s total cost.
3.1 Nomenclature
A. Sets and Indices
A Set of appliances indexed by a
I Set of users indexed by i
i− Denote all other users in I except user i
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T Set of time periods indexed by t
T 0i,a The unacceptable time periods for user i to use appliance a
T 1i,a The preferred time periods for user i to use appliance a
B. Parameters
Di,a The daily demand of user i on appliance a
Ei,a The maximum electricity that can be consumed by user i on appliance a in one
time period
pii The monetary value of the time-of-use convenience for user i
c0, c Electricity price coefficients in the cost function
C. Variables
xti,a Electricity consumption of user i on appliance a at time t
xi The electricity usage profile of user i, i.e., a vector of x
t




i Total electricity loads/consumptions at time t for all users and user i,
respectively







t,a Dual variables for the user model
D. Functions
f(·) Unit electricity cost as of a function of total load
ui(·) Utility function for user i
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3.2 System Optimization Model
Consider a local area power system with n users and a set of appliances A for
each user. Assume each user i has a daily energy demand Di,a for appliance a ∈ A.
We define a 24-hour daily cycle with t ∈ T = {1, 2, · · · , 24}. Further, let Ei,a be the
maximum amount of energy consumed by user i on appliance a during one unit
time. In addition, define a set of unacceptable time intervals T 0i,a ⊂ T during which
user i does not wish to use appliance a, and a set of preferred time intervals T 1i,a ⊂ T
(T 1i,a ∩ T 0i,a = ∅) during which user i prefers to use appliance a. Using this notation
and letting decision variable xti,a be the amount of energy consumed on appliance a














xti,a = Di,a, ∀i, a (3)
xti,a ≤ Ei,a, ∀i, a, t (4)
xti,a = 0, ∀i, a, t ∈ T 0i,a (5)
xti,a ≥ 0, ∀i, a, t (6)
where f(lt) represents the unit electricity (generation) cost at time t, which is a
monotone increasing function of the total electricity consumption lt at time t. In the
SO model, the objective in (1) is for the central controller to minimize the total
electricity cost required to serve all users. Furthermore, constraints (2) calculate the
total energy consumption lt at time t by all users and constraints (3) ensure that
user i’s energy demand for appliance a is met. In addition, constraints (4) state that
the total energy used by user i’s appliance a during each time interval does not
exceed Ei,a, an upper bound due to technical specification. Finally, constraints (5)
22
ensure that user i does not use appliance a at any time interval t ∈ T 0i,a.
Theorem 1. If g(z) = f(z)z is strictly convex, then the SO model has a unique
global solution l∗.
Proof. Let
F = {lt|(2)− (6)}. (7)
Clearly, this feasible region F is a convex, closed and bounded set. Thus, any local
minimum is the global minimum and the uniqueness of the global minimum follows
immediately from the strict convexity of the objective function
∑T
t=1 g(lt) (see e.g.,
[65]).
While the above theorem shows the uniqueness of the optimal load vector l∗t
when g(·) is strictly convex, individuals’ energy consumption vector x∗ti,a may not be
unique under the same condition. Below is a counter example.
Consider a system with two users (n = 2), two appliances (|A| = 2) and four
time intervals (T = 4). The demand profiles are: D1,1 = 7, D1,2 = 3, D2,1 = 6, and
D2,2 = 4. The Upper bounds are: E1,1 = 3, E1,2 = 1, E2,1 = 4, and E2,2 = 3. The
unacceptable usage window T 0i,a = ∅ for i = 1, 2 and a = 1, 2. Suppose
f(lt) = 10 + 3lt, then g(lt) = 3l
2
t + 10lt is strictly convex. The optimal load profile for
the SO model is l∗1 = 6, l
∗
2 = 6.5, l
∗
3 = 6.5, and l
∗
4 = 1. One can easily verify that the
following two consumption profiles x˘ti,a and x˜
t




































The SO model assumes a centralized decision system where the central area
controller in the power distribution network wishes to coordinate energy
consumption for all of its subscribers. Thus, the SO model provides an energy
consumption profile with the least electricity cost. On the other hand, in practice
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each subscriber may be more interested in their own electricity usage, not so much
in others or even the average usage for the entire system. Thus, a user equilibrium
model is suitable for describing the individual subscriber’s energy consumption
behavior.
3.3 User Equilibrium Model
In modeling a user’s decision on when and how much to use his/her
appliances, we consider not only cost but also the convenience for the user to be
able to use an appliance during his/her preferred times. Thus, the user equilibrium







+ ui (xi) (8)
where lti is the total electricity consumption by user i at time t, and xi is the
electricity usage profile of user i, a vector of xti,a for all appliances and time periods.
In this payoff Ui, the first term represents the total energy cost, thus the disutility,
for user i, and the second term defines the convenience experienced by user i,
calculated by his/her personal utility function ui(·) in terms of monetary value. In
general, ui (xi) can incorporate different monetary values or functions toward













i,a are the monetary value of convenience and the utility function for user i
to use appliance a at time t, respectively. Furthermore, the reason, for a user to
take into account the unit generation cost to calculate his/her total consumption
cost, is the wide use of smart electricity meters which enable the user-to-generator
and user-to-user communication in the smart grid. Hence, in a distributed manner,
each user solves the following user’s problem:
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xti,a = Di,a, ∀a (11)
xti,a ≤ Ei,a, ∀a, t (12)
xti,a = 0, ∀a, t : t ∈ T 0i,a (13)
xti,a ≥ 0, ∀a, t (14)
The UO model is for each user i to maximize his/her payoff assuming the
knowledge of others’ usage profile xi− , {xtj,a}a,j6=i, and the decision variables only
pertain to user i’s energy consumption profile xti,a and the resulting load profile l
t
i.
Thus, the objective (9) for user i is to minimize the total disutility, i.e., the energy
cost less the convenience-based utility. Note that in calculating the energy cost, the




i−) in order to distinguish
user i’s decision variable lti from the input parameter l
t
i− . Constraints (10)-(14) for
the UO model are similar to (2)-(6) in the SO model. Finally, if each user solves
his/her own UOi, then the system of n user problems, i.e., {UOi}i=1,··· ,n, may reach
an equilibrium defined below.
Definition 2. Let Xi = {xi|(10)− (14)} be the set of feasible consumption profiles
and x , {xi}i=1,··· ,n be the usage profile for an n-user system. Then, x∗ is at user
equilibrium if and only if each user i does not have the incentive to unilaterally





i−) ≥ Ui(xi; x∗i−),∀xi ∈ Xi, i = 1, · · · ,n. (15)
Theorem 3. If g(z) = f(z)z is convex and the utility function ui is concave for all
user i, then there exists a user equilibrium consumption profile x∗ that satisfies (15).
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Proof. Recall that the simultaneous strategy space F in (7) is a convex, closed and
bounded set. Because g(lti) is convex with respect to l
t
i, ui is concave with respect to




i,a as defined in (10), the




i) + ui is concave with respect to x
t
i,a.
Thus, from Theorem 1 in Rosen [66], a user equilibrium that satisfies (15) exists.
Theorem 4. If g(z) = f(z)z is strictly convex and the utility function ui is strictly
concave for all user i, then there exists a unique user equilibrium consumption
profile x∗ that satisfies (15).
Proof. Because g is strictly convex with respect to lti, Theorem 2 in Rosen [66]
guarantees the uniqueness of the lti part, although not necessarily the x
t
i,a part, of
the equilibrium solution. On the other hand, the strict convavity of ui implies the
uniqueness of xti,a in the equilibrium solution, again due to Theorem 2 in Rose [66].
Therefore, the equilibrium solution (lti, x
t
i,a) must be unique.
Theorem 5. Suppose that g(z) = f(z)z is convex and the utility function ui is
concave for all user i. Further, if the unit cost function f is constant, then the SO
model and the UO model with ui = 0 for all i yield the same optimal solution.
Proof. Let the Karush−Kuhn−Tucker (KKT) conditions (e.g., Bazaraa et al. [65])
for the SO system be KKTSO, and the KKT conditions for UOi with ui = 0
(i = 1, · · · , n) be KKTUO(i). Then, it is fairly straightforward that KKTSO and
{KKTUO(i)}i=1,··· ,n are equivalent when the unit cost function f satisfies f ′(z) = 0.
Thus, if f = c0 is a constant, then the two problems have the optimal solution.
In order to characterize the equilibrium solution x∗, one introduces the






t,a for constraints (10), (11), (12), and (13)
in user i’s model UOi, respectively. Consequently, the user equilibrium problem
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{UOi}i=1,··· ,n reduces to the following mixed complementarity problem (MCP),
0 ≤ xti,a ⊥ ρit = u′i(xti,a) + λia + γit,a
+ξit,a − µit,a, ∀i, a, t : t ∈ T 0i,a
0 ≤ xti,a ⊥ ρit = u′i(xti,a) + λia + γit,a
−µit,a, ∀i, a, t : t ∈ T \ T 0i,a
0 ≤ lti ⊥ ρit = −ltif ′(lti + lti−)
−f(lti + lti−), ∀i, t
0 ≤ γit,a ⊥ Ei,a − xti,a ≥ 0, ∀i, a, t









i,a = Di,a, ∀i, a
ξit,a ⊥ xti,a = 0, ∀i, a, t : t ∈ T 0i,a
(16)
where the “⊥” sign in a ⊥ b (for a,b ∈ Rn) signifies that componentwise aibi = 0
for i = 1, · · · , n. Such a property is referred to as ai is ”complementary” to bi. In
other words, the above MCP defines the KKT optimality conditions for the
equilibrium solution x∗ and associated Lagrangian multipliers. Note that
formulating the KKT conditions in a MCP form allows for an efficient solution by
the PATH solver [67] offered by the nonlinear program software GAMS [68] used in
this study.
3.4 Computational Results
In this section, we discuss the results from our numerical simulations for
evaluating the proposed system and user equilibrium models. Both SO and UO
models were implemented in GAMS [68], a state-of-the-art modeling language for
nonlinear programs, where the SO model was solved by the CONOPT solver [69]
and the UO model was solved by the PATH solver [67]. All experiments and
simulations were run on a 16-core dual Opteron CPU server with 32GB of memory
running openSUSE 11 Linux.
Common to all numerical examples and test instances is the way we model
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the convenience experienced by users. To do so, we introduce the notion of preferred
usage window. The “preferred usage window,” denoted as T 1i,a ⊆ T , represents a set
of time periods when user i prefers to use appliance a. Note that associated with
user i and appliance a, there is also a time window T 0i,a ⊆ T when the user does not
wish to use appliance a. Thus, T 0i,a ∩ T 1i,a = ∅ holds. Using the “preferred usage










where pii is the utility coefficient representing the monetary value of convenience for




i,a is the amount of electricity from appliance a used by
user i during his/her preferred usage window. Subsequently, ui is the utility value
based on the proportion of total demand for user i that is fulfilled during preferred
usage window. We note that this specific form of utility function is widely used in
economics and decision analysis for modeling users preference (e.g., Keeney and
Raiffa [70] and Clemen [71]).
Without loss of generality, in this section, we simplify the presentation by
using [α, β] to denote T \ T 0i,a and [αp, βp] to denote T 1i,a. Thus,
1 ≤ α ≤ αp ≤ βp ≤ β ≤ 24.
3.4.1 Relationship between UO and SO consumption profiles
To begin the evaluation of the proposed user equilibrium model, we illustrate
the difference between the outcomes of the system model and the user equilibrium
model in which utilities for all users pii equal zero. The latter is because we would
like to study without introducing the notion of “convenience utility”, how the
proposed UO model performs against the SO model. In section 3.4.3, we discuss
extensively the UO model with non-zero utilities.
Consider two simple numerical examples both with two users, two appliances
and four time intervals. The attributes of the two users in these two examples are
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summarized in Table 1, where α, β, αp and βp are as defined above. One notes that
the two examples only differ by the values for β, i.e., βex1 6= βex2. The purpose of
this design will become clear later in this subsection.
TABLE 1
Parameter Values for Examples 1 and 2
user appliance Di,a Ei,a α βex1 βex2 αp βp
1 1 7 3 1 3 3 1 1
1 2 3 1 2 4 4 4 4
2 1 6 4 2 4 3 3 3
2 2 4 3 1 3 2 2 2
In both examples, for simplicity, we use the unit electricity price
f(lt) = 10 + 3lt. Then, solving the SO and UO models for Example 1 yields the
optimal consumption profiles displayed in Table 2, where the SO solution is denoted
by x¯ti,a and the UO solution by xˆ
t
i,a. Note again the UO solution is obtained by
setting utilities pi1 = pi2 = 0.
Several observations can be made from Table 2. First, the optimal solutions
to the SO and UO models (the latter with zero utilities for both users) are different.
This necessitates the study of the user equilibrium model, while using the system
model as a benchmark. Second, the total electricity cost for the SO solution is
500.00, less than the that for the UO solution (502.25). This is consistent with the
general knowledge that in a non-cooperative game the equilibrium solution does not
necessarily yield the maximal system-wide payoff. Third, comparing the costs for
user 1 under SO and UO (250 vs. 254.5), he/she is better off in the system solution.
However, user 2 is better off in the equilibrium solution (250 vs. 247.75). This
suggests that the concern of “making everybody better off” exists for the proposed
equilibrium model.
Furthermore, it is interesting to observe the results for Example 2 in Table 3.
With slight modifications to the value of β, Example 2 presents a different
comparison between the SO and UO solutions. Notably, the two models yields the
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TABLE 2
Optimal UO and SO Solutions for Example 1
user appliance time SO-x¯ti,a UO-xˆ
t
i,a
1 1 1 2.8143 3.0000
1 1 2 2.1761 2.0000
1 1 3 2.0096 2.0000
1 1 4 0.0000 0.0000
1 2 1 0.0000 0.0000
1 2 2 1.0000 1.0000
1 2 3 1.0000 1.0000
1 2 4 1.0000 1.0000
aggregate cost for user 1 250.00 254.50
2 1 1 0.0000 0.0000
2 1 2 0.5004 1.7500
2 1 3 1.4996 1.0000
2 1 4 4.0000 3.2500
2 2 1 2.1857 2.2500
2 2 2 1.3234 0.5000
2 2 3 0.4908 1.2500
2 2 4 0.0000 0.0000
aggregate cost for user 2 250.00 247.75
aggregate cost for the system 500.00 502.25
same total electricity cost 564.50, although from different solutions.
Collectively, Examples 1 and 2 suggest that although in most cases the SO
and UO models yield different solutions, it is possible that they lead to the same
system-wide optimal cost.
3.4.2 Data generation for extended testing
The data used in extended numerical experiments include two parts. The
first part characterizes users profiles, i.e., appliances a, appliances’ demand Di,a and
maximum amount of energy during a unit time for appliances Ei,a. In particular, we
use dishwasher, plug-in hybrid electric vehicle (PHEV) and air conditioner as
prototypical appliances 1, 2 and 3, respectively. The daily demand of each appliance
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TABLE 3
Optimal UO and SO Solutions for Example 2
user appliance time SO-x¯ti,a UO-xˆ
t
i,a
1 1 1 3.0000 3.0000
1 1 2 1.7875 2.0000
1 1 3 2.2125 2.0000
1 1 4 0.0000 0.0000
1 2 1 0.0000 0.0000
1 2 2 1.0000 1.0000
1 2 3 1.0000 1.0000
1 2 4 1.0000 1.0000
aggregate cost for user 1 274.00 274.00
2 1 1 0.0000 0.0000
2 1 2 2.7125 2.5000
2 1 3 3.2875 3.5000
2 1 4 0.0000 0.0000
2 2 1 3.0000 3.0000
2 2 2 1.0000 1.0000
2 2 3 0.0000 0.0000
2 2 4 0.0000 0.0000
aggregate cost for user 2 290.50 290.50
aggregate cost for the system 564.50 564.50
follows a uniform distribution in the range of 0.8 and 1.2 times of the typical daily
consumption as reported in [72]. Similarly, the upper bound Ei,a is also uniformly
distributed between 0.8 and 1.2 times of the typical hourly consumption for each
appliance. For example, the typical daily and hourly consumption of a dishwasher is
5.76 kWh and 1.44 kW. Thus, the daily demand for dishwashers Di,a=2 is set to
follow the uniform distribution between (4.6, 6.9), while the upper bound Ei,a follow
the uniform distribution between (1.152, 1.728).
The second part of the data involves the unit cost f(lt), as a function of the
load lt at any time t. We choose to use the linear unit cost function f(lt) = c0 + clt
in our simulation, which leads to a quadratic total cost function f(lt)lt = c0lt + cl
2
t .
The latter is consistent with the commonly used quadratic fuel cost in modeling
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power generation. Our choice of c0 and c is based on the DoE census report on the
retail price of electricity for 50 states in the U.S. (see e.g., [73]), with an average of
10 cents per KWh. Given an average gap of approximately 17% between the
generation and retail costs among the 50 states, we determine that c0 = 7.43 cents
and c = 1.55 cents per kWh.
3.4.3 Impacts of various users groups on the equilibrium
This section reports extensive sensitivity analysis for the UO and SO models
based on variations to the baseline scenario summarized in Table 4. In words, there
are two users, three appliances and 24 time intervals. Setting [α, β] = [1, 24] allows
both users to be able to use all three appliances any time. Note that both users
share the same profile with respect to demand Di,a and upper bound Ei,a.
TABLE 4
Parameter Values for Baseline Scenario
user appliance Di,a Ei,a α β αp βp
1 1 6.0753 1.1703 1 24 3 10
1 2 13.0305 3.2684 1 24 4 9
1 3 18.5805 2.3439 1 24 5 15
2 1 6.0753 1.1703 1 24 3 13
2 2 13.0305 3.2684 1 24 4 12
2 3 18.5805 2.3439 1 24 5 18
Utilities: pi1=pi2=5
Given special attention is the design of the “preferred usage window” for
users 1 and 2. User 1’s preferred usage window for using appliance 1 is [3,10], three
hours shorter than that for user 2 ([3,13]). Similar observations can be made for
appliances 2 and 3 between user 1 and user 2. Practically, user 1 represent those
with less flexibility on their preferred time, while user 2 represents those with more
flexibility. One focus of our subsequent sensitivity analysis is how these two groups
may affect the equilibrium solution differently.
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TABLE 5
Aggregate Measures vs. Utility for User 2
Case pi1 pi2
SO UO
Cost Disutility Cost Disutility
1 5 5 926.9182 892.1366 927.2219 877.7099
2 5 15 926.9182 871.6919 927.9788 824.936
3 5 25 926.9182 851.2473 929.0919 769.9865
4 5 35 926.9182 830.8027 930.1639 713.6645
5 5 45 926.9182 810.3581 931.4551 656.1449
6 5 55 926.9182 789.9134 932.8704 597.5788
7 5 65 926.9182 769.4688 934.3944 538.0829
8 5 75 926.9182 749.0242 936.0158 477.7459
9 5 85 926.9182 728.5795 937.6911 416.7896
10 5 95 926.9182 708.1349 939.3973 355.3186
11 5 100 926.9182 697.9126 940.2457 324.4142
Table 5 displays the aggregate measures for the SO and UO solutions when
varying the utility coefficient for user 2, i.e., pi2. Recall that pii represents the user
i’s monetary value for the convenience utility. The aggregate measures include the
total electricity cost as well as the total disutility (the total electricity cost minus
the total convenience utilities), for both the SO and UO solutions. Note that the
SO is independent of utility coefficients, thus the electricity cost for the SO solution
is fixed regardless values of pii. From Table 5, as user 2’s monetary value of
convenience increases from 5 (the baseline value) to 100, the system-wide electricity
cost for the UO solution increases from 927.2219 to 940.2457. On the other hand,
the disutility of the UO solution decreases from 877.7099 to 324.4142, which
indicates the increase of the electricity cost is dominated by the increase of the
convenience. Similarly, the disutility of the SO solution decreases (from 892.1366 to
697.9126) as well when pi2 increases. Finally, for all cases 1 through 11, the disutility
of the UO solution is consistently more appealing, i.e., less than that of the SO
solution. This validates the user equilibrium model in that the user model provides




Aggregate Measures vs. Utility for User 1
Case pi1 pi2
SO UO
Cost Disutility Cost Disutility
1 5 5 926.9182 892.1366 927.2219 877.7099
2 15 5 926.9182 843.0180 928.1562 828.5164
3 25 5 926.9182 793.8994 929.5449 776.5224
4 35 5 926.9182 744.7807 931.2226 722.3303
5 45 5 926.9182 695.6621 933.1827 666.2387
6 55 5 926.9182 646.5435 935.3919 608.4622
7 65 5 926.9182 597.4249 937.8233 549.1673
8 75 5 926.9182 548.3063 939.5396 490.078
9 85 5 926.9182 499.1877 940.0007 432.5708
10 95 5 926.9182 450.0691 941.3545 373.4698
11 100 5 926.9182 425.5098 942.2829 343.3592
Similarly, Table 6 shows the effect of increasing user 1’s utility coefficient.
Again, as pi1 increases, the electricity cost for the UO solution increases and the
disutility decreases for both the UO and the SO solutions.
More interestingly, when assemble the cost-related results in Tables 5 and 6
together, Figure 3 indicates that user 1 and user 2 have different impact on the
system cost at equilibrium. In Figure 3, the “” series corresponds to the
system-wide electricity cost with varying pi1, and the ‘’ series with varying pi2.
From the figure, the ‘’ series is consistently above the ‘’ series, implying that
increasing the utility value for user 1, who has less flexibility on the preferred usage
window, has larger effect than increasing that for user 2, who has more flexibility.
To illustrate, point A in the ‘’ series in Figure 3 represents the case where pi1 = 5
and pi2 = 55 and point B in the ‘’ series represents the case where pi1 = 55 and
pi2 = 5. Clearly, pi1 = 55 yields a higher electricity cost (935.3919) than does pi2 = 55
(932.8704), when compared to the baseline cost for the UO solution (927.2219).
Similarly, Figure 4 depicts different impact of user 1 and user 2 on the
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Figure 3. UO Cost vs. Utility
disutility of the equilibrium. Again, the “” series corresponds to varying pi1 and
the ‘’ series corresponds to varying pi2. One notes that the UO disutility is
consistently higher when varying pi1 than when varying pi2. This is because the
increased UO cost (from Figure 3) outweighs the increased convenience.
Finally, we examine the convenience experienced by users for the SO and UO
solutions under various scenarios. Recall that the (second) convenience term in the










the amount of electricity used from appliance a by user i during the preferred usage
window. In subsequent analysis, we define the “average percentage of preferred









|A| . In other words, pi is
user i’s average percentage of preferred usage over all appliances, and APPU is the
average of pi over all users.
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Figure 4. UO Disutility vs. Utility
Figure 5 depicts how p1 (the “” series), p2 (the “” series) and APPU (the
“4” series) respond to the increase of user 2’s utility coefficient pi2. Clearly, when
pi2 increases, the average percentage of preferred usage (over three appliances) for
user 2 increases, again validating the UO model from the perspective of the
convenience utility. On the other hand, the APPU for user 1 decreases as shown in
the “” series. Finally, looking at the average APPU for two users in the “4” series,
it is relatively stable but with a slight increasing trend.
Figure 6 depicts how p1 (the “×” series), p2 (the “∗” series) and APPU (the
“•” series) respond to the increase of user 1’s utility coefficient pi1. In this case, the
three series have the same trend as in Figure 5 except that they intercept around
pi1 = 25, where the two users have the same APPU. Finally, Figure 7 compares how
the APPU for both users is affected by the change of pi1 and pi2. From this figure,
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pi1=5, pi2 varies, APPU for user1
pi1=5, pi2 varies, APPU for user2
pi1=5, pi2 varies, APPU
Figure 5. Average Percentage of Preferred Usage vs. Utility 2
the system APPU is higher in the situation where pi2 is fixed and pi1 increases,
compared to the situation where pi1 is fixed and pi2 increases. This suggests that
user 1 has more influence on the equilibrium in terms of the convenience utility,
which is consistent with previous observations in terms of the system costs.
We also study the effect of the changing preferred usage window, i.e., αp and
βp, on the equilibrium solution. The baseline scenario in this experiment is the same
as the baseline in previous sensitivity studies except for pi1 = pi2 = 50. Table 7
displays the SO and UO solutions for four cases. Case 1 corresponds to the baseline.
Case 2 is constructed from the baseline by spreading out user 1’s preferred windows
for the three appliances so that they do not overlap with each other. As a result,
the electricity cost and disutiliuty for the UO solution decrease from 949.6517 to
936.6132, and from 412.4361 to 354.4051, respectively. This implies that if a user is
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pi2=5, pi1 varies, APPU for user1
pi2=5, pi1 varies, APPU for user2
pi2=5, pi1 varies, APPU
Figure 6. Average Percentage of Preferred Usage vs. Utility 1
willing to spread out his/her preferred usage window between various appliances,
the entire system is better off at the equilibrium. Compared to case 1, case 3
spreads out the preferred usage window for user 2, although these intervals still
overlap but to lesser degree than in case 1. Similar to case 2, in case 3 the total cost
and disutility decreases from 949.6517 to 932.4823, and from 412.4361 to 356.4647,
respectively, when compared to the baseline case 1. Finally, case 4 represents a
scenario where there is a large overlap amongst all six preferred usage windows for
three appliances and two users. Consequently, the system is worse off at
equilibrium, experiencing higher cost (952.4703 vs. 949.6517) and disutility
(433.5812 vs. 412.4361).
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Figure 7. Average Percentage of Preferred Usage vs. Utility
TABLE 7
UO Solutions for Various Preferred Windows
Case Appliance
User 1 User 2 UO
[αp, βp] [αp, βp] Cost Disutility
1
1 [3,10] [3,13]
















A PRICING MODEL FOR DEMAND RESPONSE WITH
CONSUMER PREFERENCE
In Chapter 3, we consider users possible preference on convenience over
cost-saving under the real-time pricing in smart grid. Through numerical analysis,
we found that the UE solution is always different from the SO solution. In terms of
the total cost and peak load reduction, it is always worse than the SO model. In
this chapter, we focus on developing a pricing framework that can make the system
model and the user equilibrium model share the same users energy consumption
profile. The objective of the system model is different from the one in Chapter 3.
The new objective of the system model to maximize the social welfare, which is the
convenience-based utility function minus the electricity generation cost function.
Li et al. [63] use dynamic pricing to coordinate the customers’ demand
responses to the benefit of individual customers and the overall system. Two models
are established. In their utility’s (system) model, they assume that the utility
company is regulated so that instead of maximizing its profit through selling
electricity to end users, its objective is to maximize the social welfare. On the other
hand, in their customer’s or user equilibrium model, each customer aims to
maximize his/her own benefit. Both objectives include two parts: a utility function
and a cost function. The utility function for the two models are identical while the
cost functions are different. Let xti,a be the energy consumption by customer i on





i,a. the system model assumes the cost function C(Q, t) to be convex and
increasing in Q for each t. On the other hand, the user equilibrium model defines
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the cost function to be the bill charged to individual user i as




i,a, where p(t) is the electricity rate at time t. They show that




i (t)) ≥ 0 for each time t can render
the equilibrium solution to be identical to the system solution.
In their paper [63], Li et al. show the existence of a pricing p∗(t) that would
reconcile the optimal solutions to the equilibrium and system models. They do not
discuss the uniqueness of either the pricing or the equilibrium solution. On the
other hand, in the area of traffic networks, congestion toll pricing has been studied
for more than a decade [74]. Bergendorff et al. [74] prove that in order to reproduce
a fixed choice of system solution, alternative tolls exist. Furthermore, they show
that these alternative valid toll vectors can be characterized by a polyhedron, or
expressed in a linear system of equalities and inequalities. Thus, in this study we
investigate: 1) the nonuniqueness of the demand response pricing under which the
user equilibrium solution would reproduce the system optimal solution; 2) the
nonuniqueness of the user equilibrium solutions; 3) the development of a framework
that optimizes demand response pricing with respect to various objectives, and
solution algorithms for the demand response pricing optimization problems.
In this chapter, we first develop a system model for social welfare
maximization (SOS) and a game theoretical user equilibrium model for pricing
(UEP). We show that the pricing scheme that would induce the equilibrium solution
to be identical to the system solution is not unique. With a desired and
pre-determined system optimal solution, we show that there exist alternative pricing
schemes to achieve the desired objective. In this way, the pricing scheme becomes
adjustable and the utility company may customize the pricing scheme to achieve
proper objectives, e.g. maximize the profit, minimize the maximum price, etc.
Second, we also show that at the equilibrium, the user’s solution is not unique. The
users’ energy consumption pattern is supposed to follow the optimal solution of
system model. But when the UEP has multiple solutions under a given pricing
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scheme, the design objective will always get worse and the obtained pricing scheme
may not be the most desirable. Third, by adopting the risk-averse Second Best Toll
Price (SBTP) concept in [75], we propose a bi-level model to solve the problem,
which the design objective is worse off when the UEP solution varies under a given
pricing scheme. Instead of designing the pricing scheme for the best case scenario,
we set the pricing under the worst case scenario. In this case, the design objective
will always better off.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Sections 4.1 and 4.2
present the system optimum and user equilibrium models respectively. Section 4.3
describes a pricing frame work to reproduce the system optimal solution for user
equilibrium model. Section 4.4 discusses results from numerical experiments and
Section 4.5 demonstrate the non-uniqueness of the valid pricing scheme and that of
the UEP solution. Section 4.6 formulates the demand response pricing optimization
problem as a bi-level program, especially when the UEP solution is non-unique and
a risk-averse pricing model is desired. In addition, discussions are also given on
possible decomposition algorithms for the resulting demand response pricing
optimization problem.
4.1 System Optimization Model of Maximizing Social Welfare
In our system model, instead of maximizing its profit through selling
electricity to end customers, the utility company’s objective is to maximize the
social welfare. In the way of considering customers’ convenience to use an appliance
during his/her preferred times, the objective function is the total customers utility
minus the utility cost of providing the electricity demanded by all customers.
Consider a local area power system with n users and a set of appliances A for each
user. Assume each user i has a daily energy demand Di,a for appliance a ∈ A. We
define a 24-hour daily cycle with t ∈ T = {1, 2, · · · , 24}. Further, let Ei,a be the
maximum amount of energy consumed by user i on appliance a during one unit
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time. In addition, define a set of preferred time intervals T 1i,a ⊂ T during which user
i prefers to use appliance a. Using this notation and letting decision variable xti,a be
the amount of energy consumed on appliance a by user i at time t, the system
optimal for social welfare maximization (SOS) model to maximizing social welfare
for the utility company can be formulated as follows:




























λia · · ·
∑
t
xti,a = Di,a, ∀i, a (19)
γit,a · · · xti,a ≤ Ei,a, ∀i, a, t (20)
µit,a · · · xti,a ≥ 0, ∀i, a, t (21)
In the SOS model, the objective (18) is for the utility company to maximize
the total social welfare considering all users’ utility. The first term in (18) represents
the utility function of all users, in which pii is the monetary value of the time-of-use
convenience for user i. Specifically, the “utility” herein stands for the convenience
users have experienced by being able to use their appliances at preferred times. The
second term represents the unit electricity (generation) cost. As mentioned





i,a at time t. c0 and c are the electricity generation
cost coefficients. Furthermore, constraints (19) ensure that user i’s energy demand
for appliance a is met. Constraints (20) state that the total energy used by user i’s
appliance a during each time interval does not exceed Ei,a, an upper bound due to




i,a ≥ 0 and µti,a ≥ 0 be the Lagrange multipliers of constraints (19) to (21),
respectively. The Lagrange equation and the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) system of
the SOS model is as follows:
Lagrange Equation:
SL(xti,a;λ, µ, γ) =
∑T






























i,a · (xti,a − Ei,a)
−∑t,i,a µti,a · xti,a
(22)
The KKT conditions for the system optimal model (KKTSOS):∑
t
xti,a = Di,a, ∀i, a (23)
xti,a ≤ Ei,a, ∀i, a, t (24)




























i,a − µti,a = 0, ∀i, a, t (27)
(xti,a − Ei,a) · γti,a = 0, ∀i, a, t (28)
xti,a · µti,a = 0, ∀i, a, t (29)
γti,a, µ
t
i,a ≥ 0, ∀i, a, t (30)
The SOS model assumes a centralized decision system where the central area
controller in the power distribution network wishes to coordinate energy
consumption for all of its subscribers. Thus, the SOS model provides an energy
consumption profile with the maximal social welfare. On the other hand, in practice
each subscriber may be more interested in their own electricity usage, not so much
in others or even the average usage for the entire system. Thus, a user equilibrium
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model is suitable for describing the individual subscriber’s energy consumption
behavior.
4.2 User Equilibrium Model of Maximizing Own Benefit
Different from the SOS model, a user’s decision is on when and how much to
use his/her appliances. We consider only the convenience for this user to be able to
use an appliance during his/her preferred times. Thus, the user equilibrium model
assumes each user i maximizes the his/her own benefit or utility. Hence, in a
distributed manner, each user solves the following user’s problem:






















αi,a · · ·
∑
t
yti,a = Di,a, ∀a (32)
βti,a · · · yti,a ≤ Ei,a, ∀a, t (33)
ρti,a · · · −yti,a ≤ 0, ∀a, t (34)
The UEP model is for each user i to maximize his/her payoff assuming the
knowledge of time-of-use pricing scheme p(t), and the decision variables only pertain
to user i’s energy consumption profile yti,a. Thus, the objective (31) for user i is to
maximize his/her own benefit, i.e., the electricity cost less the convenience-based
utility. Note that in calculating the electricity cost, the pricing scheme p(t) is
designed by the utility company and informed to customers in advance. Constraints
(32)-(34) for the UEP model are similar to (19)-(21) in the SOS model. Finally, if
each user solves his/her own UEPi, then the system of n user problems, i.e.,
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{UEi}i=1,··· ,n, may reach an equilibrium. Let αi,a, βti,a and ρti,a be the Lagrange
multipliers of constraints (32) to (34), respectively, the Lagrange equation and the
KKT system of the UEPi model is shown as follows:
Lagrange Equation:
UL(yti,a;α, β, ρ) =
∑T
























i,a · (yti,a − Ei,a)
−∑t,a ρti,a · yti,a
(35)
The KKT conditions for the user equilibrium KKT(KKTUEP):∑
t
yti,a = Di,a, ∀a (36)
yti,a ≤ Ei,a, ∀a, t (37)

















p(t) + αi,a + β
t
i,a − ρti,a = 0, ∀a, t (40)
(yti,a − Ei,a) · βti,a = 0, ∀a, t (41)
yti,a · ρti,a = 0, ∀a, t (42)
βti,a, ρ
t
i,a ≥ 0, ∀a, t (43)
In Li et al.’s paper [63], they claim that if the utility company set the
time-of-use electricity price equal to the first derivative of the electricity generation
cost function, the customers’ consumption profile (yti,a) will be the same as the
system optimum model solution xti,a. This is a direct result comparing KKTSOS
and KKTUEP. If three pairs of Lagrange multipliers are equal to each other, i.e.













i,a will make these
two KKT systems [(23)-(30) and (36)-(43)] identical. Thus, user’s energy
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consumption profile of UEP (yti,a) under this pricing scheme (p
∗(t)) will be the
solution of the SOS model.
However, this is only one feasible pricing scheme that renders the UEP
solution to reproduce the SOS model. Below we define a set of pricing schemes
P = {p(t)|(44)− (48) hold for some α, β and ρ}. We show that: 1) set P is
nonempty; 2) for any p(t) ∈ P , the UEP solution would be identical to the system
solution; 3) set P is convex.




i,a) ·Di,a]−1/2 + αi,a + βti,a − ρti,a = 0, ∀a, t (44)
p(t) + αi,a + β
t
i,a − ρti,a = 0, ∀a, t (45)
(xti,a − Ei,a) · βti,a = 0, ∀a, t (46)
xti,a · ρti,a = 0, ∀a, t (47)
βti,a, ρ
t
i,a ≥ 0, ∀a, t (48)
where xti,a is the solution set of SOS model, computed by equations (18) to (21). By
setting different objectives, we may find different solution sets of
S ≡ {p(t), αi,a, βti,a, ρti,a} that can solve equations (44) to (48). If we can find such set
S and because equations (44) to (48) are the KKT system of the UE, we can prove
that the SOS model and the UEP may share the same solution set xti,a = y
t
i,a. We
show our computational results for multiple pricing schemes in section 4.4. We also
show in section 4.4 that under the given pricing scheme, UEP has multiple solutions
and it is always worse than the optimal objective value achieved by the SOS model.
Note that the third assertion above is true only when the SOS model has a
unique optimal solution. This requires the cost function of the SOS model to be
strictly convex. If the SOS has multiple optimal solutions, then we can find sets of
pricing schemes P1,P2, ... that can make the UEP model render the same solution as
the SOS model. Then the union of all sets {P1 ∪P2 ∪ ...} may or may not be convex.
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1. Solve the SOS model and let Xs solves (18)-(21).
2. Identify the set P of valid pricing schemes for demand response by
substituting Xs into (44)-(48).
3. Solve the following pricing problem for a desired demand response
pricing scheme.
min{g(p)|p ∈ P from Step 2.}
4.3 A DR Pricing Framework
We propose a framework of demand response pricing whose goal is that the
user equilibrium solution under such pricing will reproduce the system solution. The
framework offers alternative pricing schemes depending on various pricing objectives
chosen by utility authorities.
4.4 Computational Results
4.4.1 Data generation for extended testing
In this section, we discuss the results from our numerical simulations for
evaluating the proposed system and user equilibrium models. Both SOS and UEP
models were implemented and solved in GAMS [69], a state-of-the-art modeling
language for nonlinear programs. All simulations were run on a 16-core dual
Opteron CPU server with 32GB of memory running openSUSE 11 Linux.
The data used in extended numerical experiments include two parts. The
first part characterizes users profiles, i.e., appliances a, appliances’ demand Di,a and
maximum amount of energy during a unit time for appliances Ei,a. In particular, we
use dishwasher, plug-in hybrid electric vehicle (PHEV) and air conditioner as
prototypical appliances 1, 2 and 3, respectively. The daily demand of each appliance
follows a uniform distribution in the range of 0.8 and 1.2 times of the typical daily
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consumption as reported in [72]. Similarly, the upper bound Ei,a is also uniformly
distributed between 0.8 and 1.2 times of the typical hourly consumption for each
appliance. For example, the typical daily and hourly consumption of a dishwasher is
5.76 kWh and 1.44 kW. Thus, the daily demand for dishwashers Di,a=2 is set to
follow the uniform distribution between (4.6, 6.9), while the upper bound Ei,a follow
the uniform distribution between (1.152, 1.728).
































2. The latter is consistent with the
commonly used quadratic fuel cost in modeling power generation. Our choice of c0
and c is based on the DoE census report on the retail price of electricity for 50
states in the U.S. (see e.g., [73]), with an average of 10 cents per KWh. Given an
average gap of approximately 17% between the generation and retail costs among
the 50 states, we determine that c0 = 7.43 cents and c = 1.55 cents per kWh.
4.4.2 Pricing scheme design and results
This section reports pricing scheme design for various objectives based on
scenario summarized in Table 8. In words, there are two users, three appliances and
24 time intervals. Setting [α, β] = [1, 24] allows both users to be able to use all three
appliances any time. Note that both users share the same profile with respect to
demand Di,a and upper bound Ei,a. The “preferred usage windows” for users 1 and
2 are different. For example, user 1’s preferred usage window for using appliance 1 is
[3,10] and that for user 2 is [3,13]. Similar observations can be made for appliances
2 and 3 between user 1 and user 2.
In order to obtain different pricing schemes, we design various objective
function scenarios and describe them as follows.
Marginal Pricing (MP ): Let p(t) be the first derivative of the electricity
49
TABLE 8
Parameter Values for Baseline Scenario
user appliance Di,a Ei,a α β αp βp
1 1 6.0753 1.1703 1 24 3 10
1 2 13.0305 3.2684 1 24 4 9
1 3 18.5805 2.3439 1 24 5 15
2 1 6.0753 1.1703 1 24 3 13
2 2 13.0305 3.2684 1 24 4 12
2 3 18.5805 2.3439 1 24 5 18
Utilities: pi1=pi2=5




i,a in our case. This is the
pricing scheme claimed by Li et al. in [63].
Minimum Total (MinT ): The objective is set to be the minimum of the
total revenue for the utility company, or the total financial burden for the
consumers.
Minimum of Maximum (MinMax): The objective is to minimize the
maximum of all possible p(t).
Netzero Total (Net0): The objective is set to be net zero profit for the
utility company. This scheme can have two applications. One awards some kind of
credits (i.e., negative cost) to users when they use appliances during designated
off-peak hours. The other allows for users to discharge and sell the electricity at a
certain rate when they are equipped with battery storage devices.
Maximum Total (MaxT ): The objective is set to be the maximum of total
profit for the utility company with an upper bound of p(t) ≤ P . P is the constant
and can be properly chosen by the utility company. In our case, we randomly
choose P = 1, 9, 10 or 15 .
Table 9 displays various pricing schemes for different objectives shown in
Scenarios 1 to 5. In the second column, we list the solution profile for SOS model.
The p(t) of scenario 1 to 4 are listed in column 3 to 6 in Table 9. For scenario 5, the
p(t) with upper bound of 1, 9, 10 or 15 are listed in column 7 to 10, respectively.
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The bottom row of Table 9 displays total profit in each scenario. It proves that
various pricing schemes exist, under which the UEP may have the same users’
energy consumption profile as the optimal solution of SOS model. Given this
solution profile xti,a, we solve equations (44) to (48) with various designed objective
functions to get S ≡ {p(t), αi,a, βti,a, ρti,a}. Adopting this method, the utility
company can properly design their electricity pricing scheme to achieve their desired
objective. For example, if the utility company is willing to maximize their profit and
there is a regulation limiting the highest electricity price to less than or equal to an
exact price, i.e. 10, the utility company can set its pricing scheme following column







i,a MP MinT MinMax Net0
MaxT
P = 1 P = 9 P = 10 P = 15
1 3.0711 16.9504 0 0 -0.22 0.5619 8.5619 9.5619 14.5619
2 3.0711 16.9504 0 0 -0.22 0.5619 8.5619 9.5619 14.5619
3 3.0711 16.9504 0 0 -0.22 0.5619 8.5619 9.5619 14.5619
4 3.2124 17.3885 0.4381 0.4381 0.2181 1 9 10 15
5 3.2124 17.3885 0.4381 0.4381 0.2181 1 9 10 15
6 3.2124 17.3885 0.4381 0.4381 0.2181 1 9 10 15
7 3.2124 17.3885 0.4381 0.4381 0.2181 1 9 10 15
8 3.2124 17.3885 0.4381 0.4381 0.2181 1 9 10 15
9 3.2124 17.3885 0.4381 0.4381 0.2181 1 9 10 15
10 3.2124 17.3885 0.4381 0.4381 0.2181 1 9 10 15
11 3.2124 17.3885 0.4381 0.4381 0.2181 1 9 10 15
12 3.2124 17.3885 0.4381 0.4381 0.2181 1 9 10 15
13 3.2124 17.3885 0.4381 0.4381 0.2181 1 9 10 15
14 3.1977 17.3428 0.3924 0.3924 0.1724 0.9543 8.9543 9.9543 14.9543
15 3.1977 17.3428 0.3924 0.3924 0.1724 0.9543 8.9543 9.9543 14.9543
16 3.0711 16.9504 0 0 -0.22 0.5619 8.5619 9.5619 14.5619
17 3.0711 16.9504 0 0 -0.22 0.5619 8.5619 9.5619 14.5619
18 3.0711 16.9504 0 0 -0.22 0.5619 8.5619 9.5619 14.5619
19 3.0711 16.9504 0 0 -0.22 0.5619 8.5619 9.5619 14.5619
20 3.0711 16.9504 0 0 -0.22 0.5619 8.5619 9.5619 14.5619
21 3.0711 16.9504 0 0 -0.22 0.5619 8.5619 9.5619 14.5619
22 3.0711 16.9504 0 0 -0.22 0.5619 8.5619 9.5619 14.5619
23 3.0711 16.9504 0 0 -0.22 0.5619 8.5619 9.5619 14.5619
24 3.0711 16.9504 0 0 -0.22 0.5619 8.5619 9.5619 14.5619
Total reveneu 1294.18 16.58 16.58 0.00 58.93 661.92 737.29 1114.15
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4.5 Non-uniqueness of UEPi Model
Observations on Non-Uniqueness of UEP Solutions: Our preliminary experiments
show that the UEP may have multiple solutions under a given pricing scheme, i.e.,
the users’ energy consumption pattern may not follow the optimal solution of
system model. For example, when substituting the marginal pricing (MP) in Table
9 into UEPi model, the corresponding KKTUEP system with (36)-(43) yields an
UEP solution (the last column in Table 10) with a total welfare of -1086.6029. This
is less desirable than that of the SOS solution (-876.5805). Thus considerations
ought to be given to the non-uniqueness of the UEP solution when designing a
pricing scheme. This motivates the robust pricing in Section 4.6.
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4.6 A Robust Pricing Model
As noted previously, for a given pricing scheme p the UEP solution may not
be unique. Thus, we propose the following robust pricing multi-level optimization





s.t. L ≤ pt ≤ U, ∀t (50)













−∑Tt=1[(c0 + c ·∑i,a yti,a) ·∑i,a yti,a] is the














1 16.9504 3.0711 1.9319
2 16.9504 3.0711 3.7903
3 16.9504 3.0711 7.1828
4 17.3885 3.2124 6.5792
5 17.3885 3.2124 9.6446
6 17.3885 3.2124 5.5697
7 17.3885 3.2124 2.9916
8 17.3885 3.2124 3.0861
9 17.3885 3.2124 7.2570
10 17.3885 3.2124 2.9916
11 17.3885 3.2124 3.2764
12 17.3885 3.2124 1.3033
13 17.3885 3.2124 1.1901
14 17.3428 3.1977 1.1901
15 17.3428 3.1977 1.1901
16 16.9504 3.0711 2.1356
17 16.9504 3.0711 2.1356
18 16.9504 3.0711 3.7131
19 16.9504 3.0711 1.9319
20 16.9504 3.0711 1.9319
21 16.9504 3.0711 1.9319
22 16.9504 3.0711 1.9319
23 16.9504 3.0711 0.4856
24 16.9504 3.0711 0.0000
Social welfare -876.5805 -1086.6029
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CHAPTER 5
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF ENERGY CONSUMPTION IN
SUB-METERED HOMES AND AN OPTIMAL CONSUMPTION
SCHEDULING METHOD
This chapter focuses on DLC in smart grid at the micro-level for major
energy-consuming appliances, which account for up to 30% of the residential
electricity consumption [76]. We study empirical data from a DR pilot program in
Kentucky in an attempt to understand consumer behavior under DR event. We
expect that the real data collected can be integrated to models developed in
Chapters 3 and 4.
In the literature, many have studied DLC under the smart grid framework.
For example, in order to solve the chronic problem of severe power shortage in the
summer for the Taiwan Power Company (TPC), Chu et al. [37] adopt the method
of dynamic programming to optimally determine the schedule of the DLC with the
objective of minimizing the amount of load reduction to lessen the effects of
customers’ discomfort and to maintain the TPC’s total incomes. Ramanathan and
Vittal [38] develop a an optimization problem for designing and assessing DLC
program with the objective of minimizing end-user discomfort. More related to our
work, McIntyre et al. [76] conduct a multi-phase study, in which different DR
strategies are tested and energy consumption is measured during each phase. Their
results show that the use of highly energy efficient appliances can achieve a
significant reduction in energy consumption under real-world conditions. They also
demonstrate the ability of smart appliances to react to remote pricing signals, which
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can produce a measurable decrease in energy consumption during high price periods
and may help utilities manage their demand peaks.
While the above mentioned research focuses on the DLC methods under
various conditions, it is desirable to have a micro-level and/or detailed analysis on
real data to reveal how customers may act upon a DR event. One contribution of
this chapter is that it is the first study of demand response in smart grid revealing
real life sub-metered data. In particular, this chapter consists of three parts. First,
detailed home energy consumption profiles obtained from a pilot study by a local
utility company are reported and investigated for clustering analysis. A total of 10
local homes equipped with sub-meters enabling measurements at individual
appliance level have been studied. They are divided into 6 clusters based on their
daily and peak-period energy consumption in the summer, and 2 clusters in the
winter. Second, a heuristic scheduling algorithm that coordinates the time and
length of the use of smart appliances, i.e. Thermo-Stat (TSTAT), Heat Pump
Water Heater (HPWH) and Battery System, is proposed. The goal of this heuristic
algorithm is to minimize the peak load during designated period of three hours,
which is defined as 2-5pm in the summer and 7-10am in the winter. Finally,
consumer survey from the pilot program indicates that many electricity consumers
would rely upon central utility to control major appliances such as TSTAT and
HPWH, as well as the operation of the battery and inverter units, in order to
manage demand during the predicted peak periods. Therefore, a mixed integer
programming (MIP) model for energy consumption scheduling is developed to
optimally control these loads and storage in minimizing the peak load of the peak
window for the entire system.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.1 presents a
detailed home energy consumption profile clustering analysis based on the data from
a pilot study by a local utility company. Section 5.2 establishes a heuristic rotation
model for the energy consumption scheduling problem. Section 5.3 develops the two
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MIP models for the optimal energy consumption scheduling. Section 5.5 reports the
numerical results.
5.1 Clustering Analysis for Home Energy Consumption Profiles
In 2012∼2013, a major US home appliance manufacturer, a local regulation
authority and a local utility company in Kentucky together initiated a pilot study
with the end goal of DR through the use of smart appliance infrastructure and load
shifting. The group wanted to know if through proper incentives, consumers could
use smart appliances along with a central control unit to shift appliance loads.
Ultimately, this pilot study will help justify and validate an innovative rate
structure, which not only charges for the energy consumed each month, but also
charges for a home’s peak load during the designated system peak window. The
appliance types considered in the pilot study are dishwasher, clothes washer, dryer,
HVAC, water heater, refrigerator, and range.
30 local homes are engaged in this study with a test group of 20 homes and a
control group of 10 homes. Care is taken to make sure that homes within each
group are comparable in terms of appliance types. All 30 homes are equipped with
sub-meters enabling measurements at the individual appliance level (e.g., HVAC,
water heater). The 20 test homes have undergone appliance upgrade with smart
appliances and have undergone demand response events in later phases. The 10
control homes, on the other hand, have received no upgrades. Therefore, the energy
consumption data at the appliance level for these 10 sub-metered control homes
becomes extremely valuable for the micro-level clustering analysis.
Figure 8 displays an example of the energy consumption of a control home in
a typical summer day. In Figure 8, the total load is the sum of the HVAC load,
water heater load and the baseline load. The time axis represents the starting point
of each time interval. In this case, the entire day is divided into 24 continuous time
intervals, which means each time interval equals to 1 hour. Time 14 represents the
57
Figure 8. An energy consumption example of a control home in a typical summer day
2-3pm and the time interval between 14 and 16 represents the peak period from
2pm to 5pm. For this particular home #29, its peak load of the day occurs at time
15, which is 3-4pm, with a total load of 3.144 kW.
All 10 control homes are analyzed and grouped using two rules: 1) if the daily
peak occurs in the peak period (2-5pm), and 2) the highest kW in the peak period.
Based on the above two rules and information in Table 11, all 10 control homes are
divided into 6 clusters listed in Table 12. Take home #21 as an example, its daily
energy peak load is 4.078 kW, which occurs at 4pm during the system peak period.
Three of the other 9 homes also have their daily peak load during the system peak
period but with different peak load values. Home #24 has the peak load of over 5
kW at 5pm and home #26 and #29 both have a peak load of around 3.1 kW at
4pm. Therefore, the four homes with peak load inside the system peak period are
divided into 3 clusters. For the other 6 homes having their daily peak load outside
the system peak period, we distinguish them according to their highest kW between
2pm and 5pm. Home #23 and #30 have highest load in peak period at around 4.5
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kW and they are grouped in cluster 4. Similarly, home #22 and home #27’s highest
load during peak window are about 3.8 kW, home #25 and home #28 have their
highest load between 2pm and 5pm at about 2.65 kW. Therefore, these four homes
are divided into two clusters, cluster 5 and cluster 6. Hence, all the 10 control homes
are divided into 6 clusters with the frequency of each cluster shown in Table 12.
TABLE 11
10 control homes peak load and timing during a typical summer day
Home#
Peak or Nonpeak Highest kW
Peak time Peak kW
between 2-5pm between 2-5pm
21 Peak 4.078 4pm 4.078
22 Non-peak 3.775 6pm 4.036
23 Non-peak 4.471 11am 6.122
24 Peak 5.198 5pm 5.198
25 Non-peak 2.649 7pm 4.311
26 Peak 3.148 4pm 3.148
27 Non-peak 3.988 11pm 4.991
28 Non-peak 2.746 9pm 3.209
29 Peak 3.144 4pm 3.144
30 Non-peak 4.626 7pm 5.101
TABLE 12
Clusters of summer homes
Cluster Representative homes Frequency
1 #21 0.1
2 #24 0.1
3 #26, #29 0.2
4 #23, #30 0.2
5 #22, #27 0.2
6 #28, #25 0.2
Among the 10 control homes, only home #21 and home #28 are equipped
with electric heater, while the other 8 homes are equipped with gas heater for
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winter. Therefore, only home #21 and home #28 are considered in winter home
energy consumption profile cluster analysis. The study is based on the similar rules
that are used for the summer homes: 1) if the daily peak occurs in the peak period
(7-10am), and 2) the highest kW in the peak period. Based on the above two rules
and information in Table 13, each of the 2 homes represents its own cluster as listed
in Table 14. Take home #21 as an example, its daily energy peak load is 5.134 kW,
which occurs at 11pm outside the system peak period. For home #28, its daily peak
load is also outside the system peak period at 3.067 kW.
TABLE 13
2 control homes peak load and timing during a typical winter day
Home#
Peak or Nonpeak Highest kW b
Peak time Peak kW
between 7-10am etween 7-10am
21 Non-peak 5.134 11pm 5.866
28 Non-peak 3.067 6pm 3.227
TABLE 14
Clusters of winter homes
Cluster Representative homes Frequency
1 #21 0.5
2 #28 0.5
We like to note that the relatively small sample size of 10 makes this
clustering analysis difficult. The intent here is to propose a method that will be
applied to a future work consisting of 330 local homes. We can then divide all the
330 homes into clusters based on the rules described above for both summer and
winter. Then either the heuristic algorithm in Section 5.2 or the optimal energy
scheduling models in Section 5.3 can be developed based on these clusters.
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5.2 A Heuristic Rotation Algorithm for 330 Homes
Consider a local utility company that considers to call for DR event on 330
selected homes. Thus, this and subsequent sections extend the energy consumption
sub-metered data from the 10 control homes presented in last section to 330
involved local homes. There are three supporting smart appliances/systems for the
demand response system considered in this study. The HPWH allows residents to
preheat and elevate (∼ 165oF) the water temperature off peak and control and
prevent heating on peak. The programmable TSTAT can be controlled via Wifi to
schedule the HVAC temperature set points, thus minimizing peak demand. The
battery system stores energy by charging during off-peak periods and discharge
during peak periods.
In order to effectively manage demand response supported by these 3
technologies: HPWH, TSTAT and battery system, we develop a heuristic scheduling
algorithm that coordinates the time and length of the use of the HPWH, TSTAT
and battery system. The goal of this heuristic algorithm is to minimize the peak
load during designated system peak period of three hours, which is defined as 2-5pm
in the summer and 7-10am in the winter.
The algorithm is described in detail in Table 15, and can be summarized as
follows. We consider 3 clusters in this demonstration of the scheduling only. First,
the scheduling of the HPWH works as follows. All homes can start at the same time
and finish at the same time; no rotation is needed because HPWH is not used
during the system peak window. In the Summer, the HPWH starts to work at
midnight and lasts for 5 hours to fulfill the daily demand. For the rest of the day, it
draws minimal power. Similarly, the HPWH starts to work at 11pm the previous
day and lasts for 7 hours in winter days. Second, the operations of TSTAT is
designed so as to ensure the maximal thermal comfort level and to minimize the
peak load during the peak window. The usage of TSTAT is rotated among three
clusters. Each TSTAT incurs a (3,0,3,0,3,3,1.5) consumption pattern for 7 hours,
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starting pre-cool at 1pm in summer, and pre-heat at 5am in winter. For example, in
summer days, users in cluster 1 can start pre-cool their homes at 1pm. Then users
in the following cluster may delay their pre-cool time by τ minutes, and users in
cluster n may delay their pre-cool time by (n− 1) ∗ τ minutes. Consequently, all
subsequent steps for scheduling TSTAT described in 1b-1h for cluster n will delay
by (n− 1) ∗ τ minutes. Third, the rotation scheduling for TSTAT will not affect the
charging of battery system for each user, while the discharging of the battery will be
affected. According to the consumption pattern of TSTAT, it requires discharging
pattern of (0,0,-3,0,-3,-3,0) from battery. Each Battery gives 3kW for 3 hours,
totaling a 9 kWh storage. As we described in step two of battery scheduling, it is
discharged to fully or partly mitigate the load of TSTAT during peak window. In
this way, the users’ thermal comfort level is ensured at a maximal level, and the
peak load of the system during peak window is minimized. The scheduling of winter
homes is similar to scheduling summer homes as described above.
While the above heuristic rotation algorithm is to minimize the peak load of
the system during peak window with the consideration of maximum users’ thermal
comfort level, it cannot ensure the optimality of the entire system. To achieve the
latter, we develop the centralized system peak minimization SPM-1 and SPM-2
models in Section 5.3.
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TABLE 15
Outline of heuristic device scheduling algorithm
Devices Steps for Scheduling
HPWH
1. In the summer, pre-heat starts at midnight and lasts for 5 hours.
For the rest of the day, the HPWH draws minimal power.
2. In the winter, pre-heats starts at 11pm the previous day and lasts
for 7 hours. For the rest of the day, the HPWH draws minimal
power.
TSTAT
1. In the summer when the peak period is 2-5PM, T-stat of first
cluster homes works as follows:
a. 1 PM. Pre-cool the home at maximal capacity.
b. 2 PM. Cool the home at minimum capacity that can avoid room
temperature rebound in the near future.
c. 3 PM. Cool the home at maximal capacity.
d. 4 PM. Cool the home at minimum capacity that can avoid room
temperature rebound in the near future.
e. 5 PM. Cool the home at maximal capacity.
f. 6 PM. Cool the home at maximal capacity.
g. 7 PM. Cool the home at medium capacity that can avoid room
temperature rebound in the near future.
h. All other periods, the T-stat keeps the same consumption pattern
as the regular HVAC system.
2. In the winter when the peak period is 7-10AM, T-stat of first
cluster homes works as follows:
a. 5AM and 6AM. Pre-heat the home at maximal capacity.
b. 7AM. Heat the home at minimum capacity that can avoid room
temperature rebound in the near future.
c. 8AM. Heat the home at maximal capacity.
d. 9AM. Heat the home at minimum capacity that can avoid room
temperature rebound in the near future.
e. 10AM. Heat the home at maximal capacity.
f. 11AM. Heat the home at medium capacity that can avoid room
temperature rebound in the near future.
g. All other periods, the T-stat keeps the same consumption pattern
as the regular HVAC system.
3. T-stat of the nth cluster homes start 1a or 2a late by (n− 1) ∗ τ
minutes and complete the process till 1h or 2g.
Battery
1. Battery is charged at midnight per allowed charging rate and hours.
2. Battery is discharged during peak period and, if any, extended
periods thereafter, in order to fully or partly mitigate the load
required by T-stat and other appliances.
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5.3 Development of MIP Models
The goal of the system peak minimization (SPM-1) model is for the utility
company to schedule an energy consumption profile for each user so that the user’s
energy demand is fulfilled while the total peak load for all users collectively is
minimized. One objective of the research is to study the effect of newly equipped
smart appliance, i.e. HPWH, TSTAT and the battery storage system, on the power
grid. Four electricity consumption sources are considered. One is the regular
household usage such as heating, lighting, washer and dryer, etc. The other three
are the demand of HPWH, TSTAT and battery system. Mathematically, let
t ∈ {1, 2, · · · , T} denote a time interval in a 24-hour cycle. For example, when
T = 24, each t represents a one-hour interval and when T = 48, each t represents a
half-hour interval. In addition, T 0 is defined as the low-demand time window and
T 1 is defined as the high-demand time window. In our case, if T = 48, the
high-demand window T 1 of summer days ranges from 27 to 42 for afternoon and
evening hours, and the rest is the low-demand window T 0. Inside the high-demand
window T 1, the designated system peak window is defined as T P . T P ranges from
29 to 34 for summer days. Therefore, T P ⊂ T 1, T 1 ∪ T 0 = T, T 1 ∩ T 0 = φ.
Consider a power distribution network with I users. Let BLit be the regular
household baseline demand for user i at time interval t, DH i, DT i, DBi be the daily
demand of HPWH, TSTAT and battery for user i, respectively. UH i, UT i, UBi are
the power rating for HPWH, TSTAT and battery of user i, respectively. LBi is the
battery discharge rate for user i. Let decision variable xit, y
i
t be the amount of
energy consumption of HPWH and TSTAT for user i during time interval t, and
uit, v
i
t be the associated binary variables indicating if the HPWH or TSTAT of user i
is assigned to use during interval t. In words, uit = 1 or v
i
t = 1 when HPWH or
TSTAT of user i is scheduled to use at time interval t, and uit = 0 or v
i
t = 0
otherwise. Decision variable zit is the amount of energy charged to or discharged
from the battery at time t for user i. rit, s
i
t are the associated binary variables
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indicating if the battery of user i is assigned to charge or discharge during interval t.
Using the above notation, the SPM-1 model of optimal energy consumption
scheduling in sub-metered homes is described below in equations (51)-(67).
(SPM-1) min P (51)















i ∗ uit, ∀i, t (55)∑
t∈T 1





i ∗ vit, ∀i, t (58)∑
t∈T 0






zit = −2/3 ∗DBi, ∀i (61)
zit ≥ 0, ∀i, t ∈ T 0 (62)
zit = UB
i ∗ rit, ∀i, t ∈ T 0 (63)
zit ≤ 0, ∀i, t ∈ T 1 (64)
zit = LB
i ∗ sit, ∀i, t ∈ T 1 (65)







t ∈ {0, 1}, xit, yit ≥ 0, ∀i, t (67)
In particular, the objective in equation (51) minimizes the peak load during
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the peak window for all users in the distribution system. Constraint (52) makes sure
that the peak load P is the largest total load Mt of any peak time interval t ∈ T P .
In our case, if T = 48, then the peak window T P ranges from 29 to 34 for afternoon
and evening hours (2-5pm). Constraint (53) calculates the total load in each time
interval t as the sum of household baseline load, HPWH load, TSTAT load and
battery charging or discharging load for all users. Constraints (54) through (56) are
constraints for HPWH. Constraint (54) ensures that each user’s HPWH daily
demand is fulfilled in a 24-hour cycle. Constraint (55) calculates the energy
consumption of each user’s HPWH at any time interval t. Further, constraint (56)
states that no user will use their HPWH during high-demand time window t ∈ T 1.
Similarly, constraints (57) through (59) are TSTAT constraints. Constraint (57)
ensures that each user’s TSTAT daily energy requirement is met. Constraint (58)
calculates the energy consumption of each user’s TSTAT at any time interval t.
Because the energy consumption of TSTAT during low-demand period (t ∈ T 0)
remains the same as the HVAC and is included in the household low-demand
window t ∈ T 0. In our case, if T = 48, then the low-demand window T 0 ranges from
1 to 26 and from 43 to 48. Constraints (60) to (66) pertains to the battery system.
Constraint (60) ensures that each user’s battery storage is charged to its full
capacity during the low-demand period T 0. Constraint (61) states that the battery
storage can be discharged 2/3 of its full capacity during the high-demand window
T 1 for user i. Constraint (62) states that the battery can only be charged during the
low-demand period and constraint (63) calculates the energy consumption of
charging battery for each time interval during low-demand times. Similarly,
constraint (64) ensures that the battery can only be discharged during the
high-demand window and constraint (65) calculates the amount of energy each
battery can discharge to the grid at each time interval during high-demand window.
Additionally, constraint (66) states that the energy discharged from the battery will
not be more than that is consumed by the TSTAT during the high-demand window.
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t are binary indicating




The objective of the above SPM-1 model (51)-(67) is to minimize the peak
load during the peak window T P .
Note that one may be interested in minimizing the peak load of the entire
day. In this way, we can achieve better performance with the respective to
peak-to-average ratio (PAR). Therefore, we can change equation (52) to (68).
P ≥Mt, ∀t (68)
We may also drop constraint (56), since the goal now is to minimize the peak
load of the entire day, the load of HPWH may fill the valley occurs at any time t.
Therefore, the following SPM-2 model can be used if the objective is to minimize
the system daily peak load.
(SPM-2) min {P |(68), (53)− (55), (57)− (67)} (69)
5.4 Modification of MIP Models
After the MIP models have been developed, it is important to realize that
there are numerous factors which exist in reality and have significant implications
on the outcome of the models. These factors include:
1. The preference of consecutive and non-interrupted running of appliances;
2. The different timing of residential and non-residential consumers load on the
grid;
3. The unwillingness of certain residential consumers to have their behavior
controlled by the centralized decision making system;
4. Thermal comfort needs by consumers.
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We will revise the MIP models to reflect each or a combination of the above
factors in this section.
We acknowledge that the original model could require frequent run and stop
of appliances as determined by the central controller, in reality there is a strong
preference that appliances are running on a continuous and uninterrupted basis.
This is because starting an appliance to run always consumes extra energy than its
normal working load. At the same time, keeping an appliance on and off too
frequently can shorten its life span. Therefore one always considers keeping an
appliance running for some consecutive time periods once it starts to run.
In the literature, Xu and Bai [77] introduced the fixed setup cost to help
reduce the percentage of non-consecutive PHEV charging in a public charging
station. Through carefully selected fixed setup cost, the percentage of
non-consecutive charging can be reduced by approximately 80%. Unlike public
charging during day-time, using an appliance such as HPWH and HVAC at home is
difficult to utilize the concept of setup cost.
In this dissertation, we use an alternative approach via the use of binary
variables to ensure continuous use of an appliance as in constraints (70) -(72).
Assuming once triggered to run, one may consider to keep the HPWH, TSTAT and
battery working at least l, m and n time periods, respectively. Note that, for the
battery, we only consider to keep it charging for at least n consecutive time periods,
but not for the discharging. For the latter, we still use constraint (66) to ensure the
energy discharged from the battery will not be more than that is consumed by the
TSTAT during the high-demand window.
uit+1 − uit + uit−1 ≥ 0,
uit+2 − uit + uit−1 ≥ 0,
..., ∀i, t
uit+l−1 − uit + uit−1 ≥ 0,
(70)
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vit+1 − vit + vit−1 ≥ 0,
vit+2 − vit + vit−1 ≥ 0,
..., ∀i, t
vit+m−1 − vit + vit−1 ≥ 0,
(71)
rit+1 − rit + rit−1 ≥ 0,
rit+2 − rit + rit−1 ≥ 0,
..., ∀i, t ∈ T 0
rit+n−1 − rit + rit−1 ≥ 0,
(72)
The second factor to consider in revising the model is the difference between
residential load and non-residential energy load. From a system point of view, the
total system energy load includes not only residential load but also commercial and
business load, or non-residential energy load. They affect the system load in
different ways and need to be examined separately. While the residential energy
consumption is supervised by the central controller as is the purpose of designing
the present models, the non-residential consumption is not supervised by the central
controller. Therefore, it is critical to include the non-residential energy load when
we calculate the hourly total system load. In addition, we want to make sure that
we do not create a new peak for the total system by shifting the consumption
pattern of the residential users, as for most of the time, especially during day-time
when the system peak load is likely to occur, the non-residential load accounts for
the majority of the total system load. Here we introduce the pricing mechanism of
peak tariff, which is a surcharge that only applies to electricity consumption that
incurs within specified time frame. The peak tariff is charged on each user’s
“coincident load” at the time when system peak load occurs.
Another important factor is that not all homes are willing to give up their
appliances’ control to the utility company. Some may prefer to take control
themselves even though they probably end up paying more on the peak tariff.
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Therefore we need to consider these users energy load although it is not controlled
by the model.
Let OLt be the non-participating regular household original total demand at
time interval t, NRLt be the non-residential total energy load at time interval t.










t) +OLt +NRLt, ∀t (73)
Together with binary constraint sets (70)-(72) for consecutively using
appliances, the following SPM-3 model can be used if
1. only part of the selected residential home owners are willing to participate in
the centralized controlled program;
2. non-residential energy load should be considered in the total system load;
3. appliance should be using for at least a consecutive time period once triggered
to run.
(SPM-3) min {P |(52), (54)− (67), (70)− (73)} (74)
Another critical factor regarding optimal energy consumption scheduling is
the users thermal comfort of using the TSTAT. In our previously developed MIP
models, this has not been considered as the energy demand has been limited on a
per day basis and in a pre-defined time window T 1. In reality the user will base
his/her decision to turn on/off the appliances on how they feel, or the ambient
temperature. In this case, it is necessary to figure out a way to capture the changing
temperature as a result of on/off decisions for the TSTAT.
Similar to the model used by Li et al. ([63]), we use a linear dynamic model
to represent an approximate thermal behavior of a house for the purpose of this
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dissertation. We denote T it and T
O
t as the temperature at time t inside and outside
the house i. As shown in (75) and (76), T it is given by a linear function of house i’s
previous room temperature T it−1, gradient between current outside temperature and
previous room temperature (TOt - T
i
t−1), and energy consumed by HVAC unit at
time t for user i, i.e., γyit. Each user may have a particular preferred temperature at
which they feel the most comfortable. Although a comfortable temperature is
generally believed to be around 70 − 72 ◦F, thermal comfort indeed varies by
people. Some people may feel most comfortable at 75 ◦F while others may prefer 65
◦F. In our model, we denote T icomf,min and T
i
comf,max as the lower boundary and
upper boundary of the comfort temperature window for user i. T 1 denotes the set of
time window that the users care about the room temperature.




t − T it−1) + γyit, ∀i, t (75)
T icomf,min ≤ T it ≤ T icomf,max, ∀i, t ∈ T 1 (76)
By incorporating the thermal comfort constraints, it is unnecessary to keep
the TSTAT demand constraint. Also, the HVAC is not always running at its power
rating UT i. LT i denotes its lower limit of energy consumption once it is on. Thus,
we replace the TSTAT demand constraints (57) to (59) with (77).
LT i ∗ vit ≤ yit ≤ UT i ∗ vit, ∀i, t (77)
The modified SPM-4 model shown below can be used by the central
controller to optimize the peak load of participating homes with the consideration of
non-participating homes load, non-residential energy consumption and user’s
thermal comfort.
(SPM-4) min {P |(52), (54)− (56), (60)− (67), (73), (75)− (77)} (78)
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5.5 Results and Discussion
5.5.1 Assumptions
When conducting numerical experiments with the proposed rotation
scheduling and MIP models, we assume that each home is equipped with the same
smart appliances, i.e., HPWH, TSTAT and battery system. We also make the
following assumptions according to the information from the smart appliance
manufacturer and users’ energy consumption profile.
• The daily demand for each HPWH is 2.5 kWh and its power rating is 0.5 kW.
Each HPWH needs to run 2.5 hours to fulfill its daily demand.
• The demand for each TSTAT during high-demand hours (t ∈ T 1) is 13.5 kWh
and its power rating is 3 kW. Each TSTAT needs to run 4.5 hours to fulfill
this demand. The demand for low-demand hours (t ∈ T 0) is included in the
baseline load (BL).
• The charging demand for each battery system is 13.5 kWh and its power
rating is 2.7 kW with an efficiency of 2/3. It can provide 9 kWh energy during
high-demand hours (t ∈ T 1) to the grid to support some of the demand of
TSTAT during that time. Each battery needs 5 hours to be fully charged and
it can provide power to the TSTAT for 3 hours during t ∈ T 1.
• The new TSTAT can only be scheduled to help users shift their peak load. It
still consumes the same amount of energy as the original HVAC. If the original
HAVC consumes more than the TSTAT during high-demand hours (t ∈ T 1),
which is 13.5 kWh, then the extra demand is compensated to the time
intervals closed to T 1, but cannot surpass its maximum power of 3 kW. This
way, the daily demand of TSTAT is kept the same as that of the original
HAVC.
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Based on the above assumptions, we first get the new energy consumption
profile with smart appliance i.e., HPWH, TSTAT and battery system, for home
#21. Then we expand this energy consumption profile of home #21 to 330 homes.
The 330 homes are with identical energy consumption profile and we evenly divide
them into three groups with 110 homes in each group. We only show results of a
typical summer day. The winter case should be similar to the summer case, only
difference is the peak window for summer is from 2-5pm and for winter, it is 7-10am.
5.5.2 Without Battery System
The battery system can help user mitigate the energy consumption caused by
the TSTAT during peak window. However, its high cost and non-necessity nature
may prevent users from purchasing it. Therefore, we first study the case that all 330
homes are equipped with only HPWH and TSTAT, but no battery system.
In subsequent analysis, we schedule all 330 homes to use their current
appliances simultaneously in the “Original” case (OL) in Figure 9, and all 330
homes to use their smart appliances, i.e., HPWH and TSTAT in the “No Rotation”
case and apply the heuristic rotation algorithm for 330 homes all equipped with
smart appliances described in Section 5.2 as the “Heuristic” case. Also, as
previously stated, we divide the entire day into 48 time intervals and each time
interval represents half an hour. We compare the energy consumption of these two
scenarios with the original profile and show the results in Figure 9. From Figure 9,
we first observe that the peak load during peak window can be reduced from 672.92
kW of the original case to 440.46 kW of the “Heuristic” case due to the effective
rotation. Note that under the “No Rotation” case the peak load increases to 689.96
kW, because the maximal power of the new TSTAT is 3 kW, which is higher than
that of the original HVAC. Second, the peak load of original case occurs at time
interval 31 and 32 and it shifts to time interval 27 and 28 for the “Heuristic” case.
Third, the valley load of “No Rotation” case and “Heuristic” case occurs at the
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same time intervals as the original load but with a lower energy load. This is due to
the more efficient HPWH, which consumes less energy than the original water
heater. Overall, for the peak load during peak window, the heuristic rotation
algorithm performs significantly better than the other two cases. It can shift the
system peak load to non-peak window effectively.
Figure 9. System total energy consumption without battery based on home #21 in
a typical summer day
The aggregate results of the above three cases are listed in Table 16. Since
the goal of the rotation heuristic is to minimize peak load during peak window, it
can be seen the “Heuristic” case can accomplish the goal very well (peak load of
440kW, compared to 672.92kW of “Original” and 687.96kW of “No Rotation”).
However, as far as the PAR is concerned, both “No Rotation” case and “Heuristic”
case are higher than the original case. This is because the peak load of the former
two cases is higher and their valley load is lower than the original case. If we only
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compare the “No Rotation” case and the “Heuristic” case, then the “Heuristic” case
has a lower PAR. Additionally, the peak load during peak window of “Heuristic”
case is much lower than the other two cases. This is consistent with the result we
obtain from Figure 9.
TABLE 16
Performance of different scenarios without battery
Original No Rotation Heuristic




5.5.3 With Battery System
If all 330 homes are equipped with battery system, then in addition to the
three cases discussed in Section 5.5.2, we add two MIP models results to our
comparison as shown in Figure 10. The curve of original case is the same as shown
in Figure 9. Also, as the battery only works during the high-demand time window
(T 1), the parts of curve outside this range for “No Rotation” and “Heuristic” cases
are the same as in Figure 9. Because the battery can provide 9 kW of energy totally
compensating the TSTAT consumption during this period, both “No Rotation” and
“Heuristic” cases have their valley load (192.96 kW), exactly same as the baseline
load. For the SPM-1 model, it can achieve the same peak load as the “No Rotation”
and “Heuristic” cases, but it does not consider users’ comfort level and schedules
the TSTAT to work after the midnight and after the high-demand period T 1. There
seems no advantage of using the SPM-1 model to minimize the peak load during
peak window when the battery system exits. The objective of the SPM-2 model is
to minimize the system peak load of the entire day, and the highest load during
peak window of SPM-2 model is 412.96 kW, which is higher than “No Rotation”,
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“Heuristic” and SPM-1 cases. However, on the horizon of the entire day , the curve
of SPM-2 model is more leveled than all the other cases.
Figure 10. System total energy consumption with battery based on home #21 in a
typical summer day
We show the performance results of the above five scenarios in Table 17.
Similar to the case without battery system, the “No Rotation”, “Heuristic” and
SPM-1 models all have higher PAR than the original scenario. However, amongst
the three models, the heuristic algorithm can achieve the lowest PAR at 1.5. This is
only slightly higher than that of the original scenario. The peak load during peak
window under these three scenarios are 192.96 kW, which is much lower than 672.92
kW of the original scenario. Further, we also add the performance result of the
SPM-2 model as shown in the last column of Table 17. Although the objective of
the SPM-2 model is different from the other three models, we can still compare its
performance in terms of the PAR. As expected, the PAR is much lower than those
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of “Original”, “No Rotation”, “Heuristic” and SPM-1 scenarios. It shows that even
though the SPM-1 model does not have advantage over the “No Rotation” and
“Heuristic” models in minimizing the peak load during the peak window, the
SPM-2 model can be applied to level the system load of the entire day and achieve
much better performance than all other models.
TABLE 17
Performance of different scenarios with battery
Original No Rotation Heuristic SPM-1 SPM-2
PAR 1.49 1.63 1.50 1.98 1.19
Peak Load in
672.92 192.96 192.96 192.96 412.96
Peak Window (kW)
5.5.4 Results of SPM-3 Model (With Non-Residential Load and Consecutive Usage
Constraints)
In this section, we consider the non-residential load when we calculate the
system total load. We also assume that only one third of 330 residential homes
participate in the program that would allow the central controller to determine
when and how much they can use their appliance in order to avoid high cost due to
the peak tariff. The rest 220 homes would prefer to take control themselves rather
than giving the right of decision to the central controller, even though they may end
up paying more during the peak window. In order to show the role of battery
system in this optimization problem, we assume that only half of the 110
participating homes are equipped with battery system. The other 55 participating
homes and 220 non-participating homes do not have any energy storage system. In
addition, we will add the consecutive using constraints and understand how that
would change the outcome.
We plot the results of SPM-3 model in Figure 11. There are two levels of
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comparisons. Both solid lines represent the system load with orange series
representing the load without optimization (marked as “OL”) and gray representing
the load with optimization (marked as “ML”). On the other hand, both dashed lines
represent residential load with (gray) and without (orange) optimization. First, we
observe that with the consideration of the non-residential load, which contributes
more than two thirds of the system total energy consumption, the system peak load
is almost certain to occur during the day time when the non-residential load reaches
its peak. Second, the peak load of original case occurs at time interval 31 and 32
and it shifts to time interval 27 and 28 for the “ML” case (i.e., with optimization).
Third, the residential load of “ML” case during the peak window reduce
significantly from the “OL” case. Overall, for the peak load during peak window,
the SPM-3 model performs significantly better than the original case. It can reduce
the system peak load during peak window effectively.
Figure 11. System total energy consumption with non-residential load in a typical
summer day
The results of the above two cases are listed in Table 18 and Table 19. Since
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the goal of the SPM-3 model is to minimize peak load during peak window, it can
be seen from Table 18 that the total system peak load during peak window can be
reduced from 2143.46 kW for the original case to 2060.51 kW for the “ML” case.
The PAR declines from 1.39 to 1.34. Note that the load of non-residential and
non-participating residence has not been optimized by the model, the effect of peak
reduction is not as significant as we have seen in Section 5.5.2 and 5.5.3. When
focusing just on the residential load, Table 19 shows that the total residential peak
load during peak window is reduced from 672.92 kW to 566.81 kW and the PAR
declines from 1.49 to 1.27.
TABLE 18













The load profile of 110 participating residential homes are shown in Figure
12. It can be observed that all energy consumption due to HPWH and battery
charging happens outside the preferred window T 1. More specifically, HPWH and
battery only consume energy from time period 1 to 10, when the system load is at
its valley. On the other hand, TSTAT only works during the preferred time window
T 1, which is from time period 28 to 42. Interestingly, the hourly total energy
79
consumption drawn from the grid in T 1 is less than or equal to the hourly TSTAT
load, thanks to the battery energy storage system. It is necessary to look into
detailed load profiles of users with and without battery in order to understand the
difference of the two groups.
Figure 12. Participating residential energy consumption in a typical summer day
In order to differentiate the users with and without battery system, we label
users equipped with battery as Group 1 and the other half without battery as Group
2. Also, we set the consecutive using parameters l, m and n in constraints (70) to
(72) at 2, 3 and 3, respectively. In this way, the HPWH works at least two time
periods once it starts to run. TSTAT works at least three time periods and battery
charges at least three time periods once they start to run. We do not constrain the
discharge of the battery and leave it to work with the TSTAT energy consumption.
Figure 13 shows the total load profile of the two groups. Group 1 consumes
much more energy during time period 1 to 10, due to charging of the battery
system. In returns, Group 1 users consume no energy from the grid during the peak
window T P . Their battery systems provide all loads that are needed by the TSTAT
in T P . This can help them avoid paying any peak tariff. Without the battery,
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Group 2 users have to draw energy from the grid from time period 33 to 34 and
they have to pay the resulting peak tariff.
Figure 13. Participating residential total energy consumption in a typical summer
day
As shown in Figure 14, the two groups have the same load profile on the
HPWH. The HPWH starts to work at time period 1 and continues to run till time
10 to fulfill its daily demand.
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Figure 14. Participating residential HPWH energy consumption in a typical summer
day
Figure 15. Participating residential TSTAT energy consumption in a typical summer
day
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Figure 16. Participating residential battery energy consumption in a typical summer
day
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Figure 15 describes the detailed TSTAT load profile of two groups. Group 1
homes first use the TSTAT at time 28, right before the peak window T P , and
continue to run it for three time periods. Then at time 33 and 40, they use the
TSTAT twice, each for three consecutive time periods. Group 2 users start to use
the TSTAT at time 33 for five consecutive time periods. At time 39, they use the
TSTAT again for another four time periods.
Figure 16 shows Group 1’s battery load profile. As we can see, the user
charges his or her battery at time 1 for ten consecutive periods to fulfill the daily
battery demand. Then the battery discharges from time 28 to 30, 33 to 34 and 42 to
provide energy to the TSTAT. This ensures Group 1’s energy consumption during
peak window all coming from the battery.
Figure 17. Outside temperature of the study area in a typical summer day
5.5.5 Incorporating Thermal Comfort in MIP models
To incorporate thermal comfort in the MIP model, we first get the 24-hour
temperature of the study area for a typical summer day. The temperature change is
plotted in Figure 17. As we can see, in a typical summer day, the outside
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temperature of the study area varies from below 73 ◦F to over 96 ◦F.
Khadgi [79] performs a study on how to identify the proper value of
parameters in the thermal behavior function. We calibrate his results with the
insulation condition and TSTAT power rating of the participating homes. In
equation (75), we set the coefficient of previous room temperature α = 1.00015, the
gradient between previous room temperature and current outside temperature β =
0.010649 and the coefficient of the TSTAT power rating γ = -0.3821. The large
range of the temperature change makes the parameters selected in constraint (75)
persuasive and fit for any summer day in the study area.
Figure 18. System total energy consumption with thermal comfort in a typical sum-
mer day
For the SPM-4 model, we first include the TSTAT demand constraint and
the results are shown in Figures 18 to 24. First, when compared to the original case,
the average load and peak load are both lower. The PAR decreases from 1.39 to
1.34. Second, users with battery (Group 1) use the HVAC before and during the
peak window and the load is provided by the battery. Users without the battery
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(Group 2) use the HVAC 2.5 hours after the peak window when the room
temperature gets close to the upper limit of the comfort zone. Finally, because the
battery can provide energy load for Group 1, the room temperature fluctuates in a
relatively smaller range. While the other group without the battery cannot use the
HVAC until the temperature hits the upper comfort limit as they want to avoid
paying the peak tariff.
Figure 19. Participating residential energy consumption with thermal comfort in a
typical summer day
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Figure 20. Participating residential total energy consumption with thermal comfort
in a typical summer day
Figure 21. Participating residential HPWH energy consumption with thermal comfort
in a typical summer day
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Figure 22. Participating residential TSTAT energy consumption with thermal comfort
in a typical summer day
Figure 23. Participating residential battery energy consumption with thermal comfort
in a typical summer day
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Figure 24. Room temperature of participating home in a typical summer day
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We then drop the TSTAT demand and incorporate constraint (77) to allow
the TSTAT working based on the thermal comfort. The results are shown in
Figures 25 to 30. Because we do not have the TSTAT demand constraint, we cannot
compare the total load of the two scenarios. Without the battery, Group 2 can only
use the HVAC after the peak window to keep the room temperature below the
upper comfort limit. With the battery as the secondary power source, Group 1 can
use the HVAC before, during and after the peak window to keep the room
temperature in a much more comfortable range.
Figure 25. Participating residential energy consumption with thermal comfort and
no TSTAT limit in a typical summer day
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Figure 26. Participating residential total energy consumption with thermal comfort
and no TSTAT limit in a typical summer day
Figure 27. Participating residential HPWH energy consumption with thermal comfort
and no TSTAT limit in a typical summer day
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Figure 28. Participating residential TSTAT energy consumption with thermal comfort
and no TSTAT limit in a typical summer day
Figure 29. Participating residential battery energy consumption with thermal comfort
and no TSTAT limit in a typical summer day
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CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
6.1 Conclusions
Smart grid promises an efficient, reliable and economical power system via
advanced models and technologies. Demand side management has gained renewed
interests recently in the advent of smart grid, with the focus on increasing energy
efficiency from end users. In this study, we consider residential end users who wish
not only to minimize their electricity cost but to maximize the utility (e.g., the
convenience of using appliances during their preferred times). A user equilibrium
model is developed for each user to maximize his/her utility consisting of
convenience as well as cost. As a benchmark, a centralized system model is also
developed for central controllers to minimize the total system-wide electricity cost.
Under mild conditions, we show that the user equilibrium exists and is unique. In
addition, we develop the sufficient conditions under which the system and
equilibrium models yield the same solution.
Numerically, we demonstrate in general the solutions to the two models are
different, even when the convenience utility is not considered. In terms of the total
electricity cost of all users, the system model yields lower costs than does the
equilibrium model. Our sensitivity analysis suggest that: 1) as users increase their
values for convenience, the system’s total electricity cost increase at the equilibrium;
2) further, this increase of the electricity cost is dominated by the increase of the
users’ utility on convenience, thus an increase of the total system-wide utility; 3)
users with less flexibility on their preferred time windows for various appliances have
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larger impact on the total system-wide measures (e.g., cost and average percentage
of preferred usage) at equilibrium; 4) the lesser degree of overlap amongst all users’
preferred usage windows for various appliances yields a better system performance
(e.g., reduced total cost) at equilibrium. These conclusions provide unique insights
for utilities to properly design their demand response programs.
We develop a system model and a game theoretical user equilibrium model to
prove that the pricing scheme, which makes the system model and the user
equilibrium model share the same users’ energy consumption profile, is not unique.
By some numerical examples, we show that with a fixed system optimal solution,
other pricing schemes exist to achieve the desired objective. In this way, the pricing
scheme becomes adjustable and the utility company may customize the pricing
scheme to achieve proper objectives. We also prove that at the equilibrium, the
users’ energy consumption pattern of UEP may not follow the SOS optimal solution
if the UEP has multiple solutions under a given pricing scheme. The design
objective will always be worse and the obtained pricing scheme may not be the most
desirable. By adopting the risk-averse second best toll pricing concept in traffic
network area, we propose a bi-level model to solve the problem, where the design
objective is worse off.
Based on a pilot study by a major US home appliance manufacturer, a local
regulation authority and a local utility company, we analyze the sub-metered homes
energy consumption data for summer and winter and develop models for minimize
peak load for the system. First, 10 control homes equipped with sub-meters are
studied for clustering analysis based on their energy consumption profile for summer
days and winter days. In summer days, the 10 homes are sorted into 6 clusters
based on the maximum load during peak window and when the peak load occurs.
Similarly, 2 clusters are built for winter days. The clustering analysis of the 10
control homes can be applied to the future work, when the pilot study is expanded
to 330 local homes enrolled in this project. Secondly, a heuristic rotation algorithm
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and four mixed integer programming (MIP) models are developed to minimize the
peak load of the entire system. The heuristic algorithm also considers the users’
maximum thermal comfort level. Without the expensive battery system, the
heuristic rotation algorithm performs better than the “No Rotation” case in two
measures of PAR and peak load during peak window. However, with the battery
system, the heuristic rotation algorithm and the SPM-1 model does not show
advantage over the “No Rotation” case in terms of the peak load during peak
window. If the goal is to level the system load of the entire day, the SPM-2 model
can reduce the PAR by over 30% compared to the “No Rotation” case.
SPM-3 model is developed to introduce the non-residential consumption into
the equation as well as consider the users preference of consecutive using of the
appliances. The PAR decreases from 1.39 to 1.34 which appears relatively minor
due to the non-residential consumption that is not regulated by the central
controller and accounts for over two thirds of total energy consumption.
SPM-4 model further considers the thermal comfort which allows all
participating homes to keep the room temperature within their comfortable range
and allows the consumers to avoid the peak tariff by using the batteries that provide
power supply during peak hours. In addition, this allows the room temperature to
fluctuate within a more desired range as compared to the group without the
batteries.
Although this dissertation has reached its goals, there were some unavoidable
limitations. First, all mathematical models developed in this research were static
models. It would be more meaningful and applicable to have dynamic models.
Second, some model parameters were based on assumptions for the purpose of
theoretical research. If we want to apply the models and results to real world
application, the parameters need to go through proper validation processes. Finally,
in order for the UE solution to be existence, the cost function needs to be convex




6.2.1 Energy Consumption Models with Elastic Demand
The price elasticity of demand used in economics assumes a certain
relationship between price and quantity demanded in a given time period [80]. It
has been widely used in the area of traffic assignment [81] for more than a decade.
With the advent of smart grid and demand response, this concept attracts more
attention of researchers in electric power system [82][83]. However, they [82][83] only
mention the applicability of the elasticity of demand in electricity markets. They do
not include the concept in any mathematical models. This section extends the
system optimal models and user equilibrium models previously developed for fixed
demand energy consumption scheduling to the problem with elastic demand. The
system problem maximizes net benefit to the energy consumers and the user
problem is the usual one of finding equilibrium with elastic demand.
We first introduce notion and then define the system and user equilibrium
models. The system model assumes that the goal of system central controller is to
maximize net user benefit, while the equilibrium problem maximizes each user’s own
benefit.
Employing notation similar to Section 3.1, in addition, let y be the variable of
electricity cost.
di,a = v(y) = Ui,a − ki,a ∗ y (79)
is the the elastic demand function of electricity cost y, where Ui,a and ki,a are
parameters and Ui,a ≥ 0, ki,a ≥ 0.
wi,a(z) = v
−1(z) (80)
is the inverse demand function of electricity demand variable z. wi,a is the
generalized electricity cost, which is a function of the electricity demand z.
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Note that, z does not really appear in equation (82).
In the system problem, the central controller maximizes net user benefit, the
difference between total user benefit and the system cost. and the system cost is
defined by
∑T
t=1 f(lt) · lt in the SO model described in Section 3.2. Thus, using





















xti,a = di,a, ∀i, a (84)
xti,a ≤ Ei,a, ∀i, a, t (85)
xti,a = 0, ∀i, a, t : t ∈ T 0i,a (86)
xti,a ≥ 0, ∀i, a, t (87)
where the objective in (83) is for the central controller to maximize the net user
benefit, which is the difference between the total electricity cost required to serve all
users and the inverse elastic demand function. Furthermore, constraints (84) - (86)
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are similar to constraints (3) - (5). The only difference is that in constraint (84),
user i’s energy demand for appliance a di,a is no longer fixed. It is the the elastic
demand function of electricity cost y and can be written as (79).
Similarly, if we apply the above elastic demand to the SOS model described




































λia · · ·
∑
t
xti,a = di,a, ∀i, a (89)
γit,a · · · xti,a ≤ Ei,a, ∀i, a, t (90)
µit,a · · · xti,a ≥ 0, ∀i, a, t (91)
Finally, we apply the elastic demand to the UEPi model in Section 4.2. We
consider the convenience for this user to be able to use an appliance during his/her
preferred times and the benefit of the elastic demand. Thus, the user equilibrium
model assumes each user i maximizes the his/her own benefit. Hence, in a































αi,a · · ·
∑
t
yti,a = di,a, ∀a (93)
βti,a · · · yti,a ≤ Ei,a, ∀a, t (94)
ρti,a · · · −yti,a ≤ 0, ∀a, t (95)
The Lagrange multipliers and KKT conditions method described in Chapter
4 may be applied to solve the above models with elastic demand.
6.2.2 Benders Decomposition Method for Proposed Bi-level Robust Pricing Model
As a follow-up to this dissertation, the Benders Decomposition [84] will be
examined as a potential solution method for solving the proposed bi-level model
(49)-(50). In Benders decomposition, a subset of variables is solved in the first-stage
master problem, and the remaining variables are determined by the second-stage
subproblem given the values of the first-stage variables [85]. Benders decomposition
is a cutting plane method due to adding a constraint at each iteration. It reduces
search region by adding linear constraints while preserving the original feasible
region.
In our case, the second-stage subproblem is to minimize the social welfare
given a pricing p. The first-stage master problem is to maximize all minimum
possible social welfare among alternative pricing with lower and upper boundary
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conditions. In this manner, we can get the robust pricing scheme, which can ensure
the maximum of all minimum possible social welfare.
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